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Due Process, Choice of Law, and the Prosecution of Foreign 
Nationals for Providing Material Support to Terrorist 
Organizations in Conflicts Abroad 
 
_________________________________ 
Brian M. Kelly* 
 
 
Introduction  
 
 In November 2012, a grand jury in the Eastern District of New York indicted Ali 
Yasin Ahmed, Mahdi Hashi, and Mohamed Yusuf under 18 U.S.C. § 2339B for 
knowingly and intentionally conspiring to provide material support and resources, 
including services, currency, weapons, and personnel, to al-Shabaab, a designated foreign 
terrorist organization.1 Although there is nothing exceptional about the United States 
prosecuting individuals for providing material support for terrorism, United States v. 
Ahmed represents a marked shift from prior 18 U.S.C. § 2339B prosecutions because 
neither the defendants nor their conduct has any apparent nexus to the United States.2 
None of the three Somali-born defendants is an American citizen; Ahmed and Yusuf are 
Swedish nationals and Hashi was a British citizen until the United Kingdom stripped him 
of his citizenship in 2010.3 The three were reportedly captured by Djiboutian authorities 
while traveling from Somalia to Yemen and then interrogated by U.S. officials in 
Djibouti. There is no indication that any of the men ever stepped foot in the United States 
before they were transferred to FBI custody and flown to New York and arrested. The 
defendants, who maintain that they are freedom fighters waging a war on foreign soil 
                                                
* J.D. Candidate, Harvard Law School, Class of 2015. Submitted in fulfillment of Harvard Law School’s 
option 1 written work requirement for J.D. candidates.  
1 See Superseding Indictment, United States v. Ali Yasin Ahmed, also known as “Ismail,” Madhi Hashi, 
also known as “Talha,” and Mohamed Yusuf, also known as “Abu Zaid,” “Hudeyfa” and “Mohammed 
Abdulkadir,” No. 12 Cr. 661, 2012 WL 6721134 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 15, 2012); 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2012); see 
also Office of the U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of New York, Three Supporters of Foreign 
Terrorist Organization al Shabaab Charged in Brooklyn Federal Court, Face Life in Prison, Dec. 21, 
2012, http://www.fbi.gov/newyork/press-releases/2012/three-supporters-of-foreign-terrorist-organization-
al-shabaab-charged-in-brooklyn-federal-court-face-life-in-prison. 
2 See Mosi Secret, Three Men Appear in Court in Mysterious Terror Case, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2012, 
(“Court documents show no connection between the alleged crimes and the United States.”); Eugene 
Kontorovich, The Offenses Clause & Universal Jurisdiction Over Terrorists, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY, 
Jan. 2, 2013, http://www.volokh.com/2013/01/02/the-offenses-clause-universal-jurisdiction-over-terrorists/ 
(“This is an extraordinary, almost unique case: none of the people or conduct has any connection to the 
U.S. . . . there is no suggestion that they planned to target American nationals or facilities, or had even ever 
been to this country before . . . . [instead] [t]he U.S. is prosecuting foreign nationals for their participation 
in a foreign civil war.”). 
3 Mark Hosenball, New York case offers insight into secret war against Somali militants, REUTERS, Oct. 6, 
2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/10/06/us-usa-shabaab-rendition-idUSBRE9950HX20131006; 
Corinne Purtill, The curious case of Mahdi Hashi, THE GLOBAL POST, Aug. 9, 2013, 
http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/europe/united-kingdom/130808/britain-immigration-
citizenship-mahdi-hashi.  
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against a foreign government, have pled not guilty and claim that they have not 
committed any acts of terrorism against the United States. As one of the defendants’ 
lawyers told reporters, “He feels he never intended any harm to the United States or 
United States citizens . . . He looked up to the United States.”4  
 
 The plight of the defendants in United States v. Ahmed raises a new and important 
question: does the extraterritorial application of 18 U.S.C. § 2339B in such a case—one 
in which foreign nationals on foreign soil allegedly supported a foreign terrorist 
organization in its war against a foreign government—violate due process? The Supreme 
Court has never considered the issue of whether the protections of the Fifth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause extend to foreign nationals in extraterritorial 
prosecutions, although a handful of legal scholars have debated the question.5 As a result, 
there is considerable confusion in the circuits today over how due process applies in these 
cases. To date, all seven circuits that have addressed this question have assumed that 
alien defendants in extraterritorial prosecutions do have due process rights and have 
held—in recognition of the Supreme Court’s state choice of law standard in Allstate Ins. 
Co. v. Hague—that the extraterritorial application of U.S. criminal law to foreign 
nationals must not be “arbitrary or fundamentally unfair.”6  
 
 However, there is a split in the circuits over what standard courts should use to 
assess whether the extraterritorial application of U.S. law to a foreign national is arbitrary 
or fundamentally unfair. The Second, Fourth, and Ninth circuits, for instance, maintain 
that to comply with due process, there must be some nexus between the United States and 
the defendants’ conduct, except in cases of crimes subject to universal jurisdiction, where 
no such connection is necessary.7 The First, Third, Fifth, and Eleventh circuits, by 
contrast, evaluate whether such an extraterritorial application of U.S. law is arbitrary or 
fundamentally unfair by inquiring whether the defendant had notice or fair warning that 
his conduct was subject to U.S. regulation.8 To determine if there was notice, these 
circuits have typically looked to whether customary international legal principles provide 
a basis for the United States to exercise extraterritorial prescriptive jurisdiction over the 
defendant.9  
 
 As this paper’s analysis of the potential due process claims in United States v. 
Ahmed will demonstrate, this confusion in the circuits has real and significant 
consequences for alien defendants in extraterritorial material support to terrorism 
prosecutions. Under the nexus criteria that the District Court for the Eastern District of 
New York is likely to apply, the court will probably find a sufficient connection to the 
United States such that the prosecution of the alien defendants under 18 U.S.C. § 2339B 
is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair and is, thus, consistent with due process. As 
                                                
4 Christie Smythe, Accused Al-Shabaab Associate Wants Trial, Lawyer Says, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Sept. 30, 
2013, http://www.businessweek.com/news/2013-09-30/accused-al-shabaab-associate-wants-trial-lawyer-
says-1. 
5 See infra Part II.A.  
6 See infra Part III. 
7 See infra Part III.A. 
8 See infra Part III.B. 
9 See id. 
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a designated foreign terrorist organization, the Secretary of State has certified that al-
Shabaab threatens the security of U.S. nationals or the national security—including the 
national defense, foreign relations, or the economic interests—of the United States.10 
Therefore, any material support that the defendants provided to al-Shabaab threatens U.S. 
interests in the stability of Somalia and the Horn of Africa.11 Moreover, by the logic of 
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, the defendants’ material support to al-Shabaab, 
even if it was directed exclusively at a foreign government, freed up other resources that 
al-Shabaab could direct against the United States.12 Thus, by this reasoning, there will 
always be a sufficient connection to the United States in extraterritorial 18 U.S.C. § 
2339B prosecutions, so alien defendants can never prevail on due process grounds in 
nexus test jurisdictions. 
 
 By contrast, if the defendants in United States v. Ahmed were prosecuted in the 
First, Third, Fifth, or Eleventh circuits, which apply a notice test, they would have a 
much better chance of persuading a court that extraterritorially subjecting them to 18 
U.S.C. § 2339B is arbitrary and fundamentally unfair and, thus, violates their due process 
rights. In a notice test jurisdiction, the defendants could argue that they could not have 
reasonably anticipated being prosecuted in U.S. court for their conduct because, while 
customary international law might recognize that the United States has prescriptive 
jurisdiction over certain overseas conduct, there is no international legal basis for the 
United States to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction over material support to a foreign 
terrorist organization where that support is not directed against the United States or U.S. 
nationals.13 Thus, without any fair warning that the United States could prosecute the 
defendants for their overseas conduct, a court in a notice test jurisdiction might decide 
that the extraterritorial application of 18 U.S.C. § 2339B to Ahmed and his co-defendants 
is inconsistent with the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. 
 
 The question of how to assess the due process rights of foreign nationals—
assuming they do have such rights—in extraterritorial 18 U.S.C. § 2339B prosecutions is 
one of growing significance. As the United States moves away from an armed conflict 
paradigm with al-Qa’ida and its affiliates, and abandons the military commission model 
of prosecution, it will increasingly seek to prosecute foreign terrorist suspects in federal 
court. 14  Given Congress’s broad powers to regulate extraterritorial conduct, facial 
challenges to extraterritorial statutes from defendants are unlikely; instead, many foreign 
defendants may choose to raise due process arguments to challenge the application of 18 
                                                
10 U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Counterterrorism, “Foreign Terrorist Organizations,” (Accessed July 6, 
2014), http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm (describing the legal criteria for the designation 
of a foreign terrorist organization under § 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act). 
11 See infra Part IV.A.  
12 See id.  
13 See infra Part IV.B. 
14 See, e.g., Jennifer Steinhauer and Charlie Savage, U.S. Defends Prosecuting Benghazi Suspect in Civilian 
Rather Than Military Court, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2014,  
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/18/world/middleeast/us-defends-prosecuting-benghazi-suspect-in-
civilian-rather-than-military-court.html (discussing the Obama Administration’s strategy of prosecuting 
foreign terrorist suspects in federal court and quoting a White House spokesperson as saying, “We have had 
substantial success delivering swift justice to terrorists through our federal court system.”). 
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U.S.C. § 2339B in their specific case. Thus, it is critically important that courts agree on 
a fair and uniform standard for ensuring that the government prosecutes foreign nationals 
for providing material support to foreign terrorist organizations overseas in a way that is 
consistent with the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. 
 
 This paper is intended to serve as an initial step in resolving that debate. Part I 
begins by discussing the Constitution’s grant of broad powers to Congress to legislate 
extraterritorially and then examines the customary international legal bases of 
prescriptive jurisdiction that permit a sovereign state to regulate conduct outside of its 
borders. Part II discusses the debate between legal scholars, chiefly Professors Brilmayer, 
Norchi, and Weisburd, over whether the protections of the Fifth Amendment’s Due 
Process Clause extend to foreign nationals in extraterritorial prosecutions and, if so, how 
courts should evaluate defendants’ due process rights. Part III analyzes the current split in 
the circuits and assesses the driving factors behind the competing nexus and notice due 
process tests. Lastly, Part IV uses United States v. Ahmed as a case study to explore the 
different prospects of the defendants’ due process claims in nexus and notice test 
jurisdictions and finds that, whereas the defendants will always lose under the nexus 
standard, they would probably prevail under the notice test. This section argues that, 
although the nexus test is more faithful to the Supreme Court’s permissive Allstate Ins. 
Co. v. Hague choice of law standard, the nexus test’s emphasis on the United States’ 
contacts with, and its interests arising from, a foreign national’s overseas conduct has 
created an insurmountable obstacle to alien defendants who invoke due process in 
extraterritorial 18 U.S.C. § 2339B prosecutions. Instead, this paper concludes that the 
notice test is better suited for judging the due process claims of foreign nationals in 
prosecutions for providing material support to terrorist organizations overseas because it 
is more consistent with traditional notions of due process as an individual right and with 
the Supreme Court’s concern about the reasonable expectations of defendants, rather than 
the interests of the regulating state, in Home Ins. Co. v. Dick. 
 
II. Congress’s Authority to Regulate Extraterritorial Conduct  
 
  A. The Constitution’s Grant of Extraterritorial Power to Congress 
   
 Article I of the Constitution confers on Congress broad powers to regulate 
extraterritorial conduct. In proscribing material support to terrorism, Congress invoked its 
powers to define and punish crimes against the law of nations, to carry out the United 
States’ treaty obligations, and to regulate foreign commerce.15 Given the breadth of 
extraterritorial authority that the Constitution grants to Congress, facial challenges by 
foreign national defendants in extraterritorial 18 U.S.C. § 2339B prosecutions are 
unlikely to succeed. Instead, a foreign national is more likely to prevail in arguing that, 
                                                
15 See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, Pub. L. No. 104–32, 110 Stat 1214, § 301(a). 
Whether Congress could rely on some inherent foreign affairs powers to pass this statute is beyond the 
scope of this paper because, in the statute’s findings, Congress only invoked its Article I authority to define 
and punish offenses against the law of nations, to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and to carry out 
the United States’ treaty obligations. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. For a discussion of the inherent external 
powers of Congress and the President, see United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304 
(1936). 
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regardless of whether Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. § 2339B in accordance with its 
enumerated powers, the application of this statute to the foreign national’s specific 
overseas conduct is arbitrary or fundamentally unfair and, therefore, violates the Fifth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause.  
 
  1. Define and Punish Clause 
 
 Congress first cited its Define and Punish powers in enacting 18 U.S.C. § 2339B. 
Article I, Section 8, Clause 10 of the Constitution grants Congress the power to “define 
and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the 
Law of Nations.”16 In defining offenses against the law of nations, the Supreme Court has 
held that Congress’ power is limited to actual violations of customary international law.17 
Otherwise, Congress could bring any extraterritorial act within its jurisdiction by simply 
defining it as an offense against the law of nations.18 However, the Court has also held 
that, for the purposes of the Define and Punish Clause, the Constitution did not freeze the 
law of nations at the time that the Framers drafted it; rather, the Court has said that 
Congress has the authority to regulate present-day violations of the law of nations so long 
as they “rest on a norm of international character accepted by the civilized world and 
defined with a specificity comparable to the features of the 18th-century paradigms [like 
piracy].”19     
 
 In invoking its powers under the Define and Punish Clause in the findings section 
of 18 U.S.C. § 2339B, Congress implied that terrorism and material support to terrorism 
have attained the normative status of other universally condemned crimes, like piracy.20 
Certainly, there is some support in the case law and legal scholarship that customary 
international law has evolved to prohibit acts of terrorism.21 For instance, some courts 
                                                
16 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10. 
17 United States v. Arjona, 120 U.S. 479, 488 (1887) (“Whether the offence as defined is an offence against 
the law of nations depends on the thing done, not on any declaration to that effect by Congress.”). 
18 See United States v. Furlong, 18 U.S. 184, 198 (1820) (noting that, if Congress were given the power to 
define violations of the law of nations, “what offence might not be brought within their power by the same 
device?”); see also 2 JAMES MADISON, DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 563 (Gallard Hunt 
& James Brown Scott, eds., 1987) (documenting the debate between Governour Morris and James Wilson 
over the use of the word “define” with reference to the “law of nations” in the Define and Punish Clause 
and noting Wilson’s concern that “[t]o pretend to define the law of nations which depended on the authority 
of all the Civilized nations of the World, would have a look of arrogance, that would make us ridiculous.”); 
Eugene Kontorovich, Discretion, Delegation, and Defining in the Constitution’s Law of Nations Clause, 
106 NW. U. L. REV. 1675, 1675 (2012) (arguing that the Define and Punish Clause only allows Congress to 
specify the elements and incidents of offenses already created by customary international law). 
19 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 725 (2004). 
20 See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, Pub. L. No. 104–32, 110 Stat 1214, § 301(a)(2) (“the 
Constitution confers upon Congress the power to punish crimes against the law of nations and to carry out 
the treaty obligations of the United States, and therefore Congress may by law impose penalties relating to 
the provision of material support to foreign organizations engaged in terrorist activity;”). 
21 The Restatement (Third), however, declined to take a firm position on this issue. See RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 404 (1987) (“A state has jurisdiction to define and prescribe 
punishment for certain offenses recognized by the community of nations as of universal concern, such as 
piracy, slave trade, attacks on or hijacking of aircraft, genocide, war crimes, and perhaps certain acts of 
terrorism . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
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have looked to multilateral treaties condemning certain acts of terrorism, like taking 
hostages or hijacking aircraft, to determine that these acts violate customary international 
law.22 Professor Anthony Colangelo, similarly, has argued that international conventions 
proscribing certain terrorist acts, such as bombing public places, infrastructure, 
transportation systems, airports, and aircraft, provide persuasive evidence that customary 
international law prohibits these acts.23 However, other courts have come to the opposite 
conclusion,24  and even Professor Colangelo has acknowledged that the absence of 
multilateral conventions prohibiting material support to, or receiving training from, a 
foreign terrorist organization demonstrates that these acts are not violations of customary 
international law.25 This would suggest that Congress requires another basis under the 
Constitution to proscribe material support to terrorism overseas. 
 
  2. Treaty Power 
 
 Congress cited its authority to carry out the United States’ treaty obligations as a 
secondary basis for enacting 18 U.S.C. § 2339B.26 Article I, Section 8, Clause 18 of the 
Constitution grants Congress the power “[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and 
proper for carrying into Execution . . . all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the 
Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.”27 Chief 
Justice Marshall confirmed the breadth of power granted to Congress under the 
Necessary and Proper Clause in McCulloch v. Maryland when he famously proclaimed: 
“Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means 
which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, 
                                                
22 See, e.g., United States v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 896, 901 (D.D.C. 1988) aff'd, 924 F.2d 1086 (D.C. Cir. 
1991) (arguing that “in light of the global efforts to punish aircraft piracy and hostage taking . . .  these 
crimes fit within the category of heinous crimes for purposes of asserting universal jurisdiction.”).  
23  Anthony J. Colangelo, Constitutional Limits on Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: Terrorism and the 
Intersection of National and International Law, 48 HARV. INT’L L.J. 121, 176–77 (2007). Professor 
Colangelo’s list of acts of terrorism that are prohibited by customary international law also includes 
“hijacking aircraft, hostage taking, and even financing terrorist organizations.” Id.  
24 See, e.g., United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 106–08 (2d Cir. 2003) (“[w]e regrettably are no closer . . 
. to an international consensus on the definition of terrorism or even its proscription; the mere existence of 
the phrase ‘state-sponsored terrorism’ proves the absence of agreement on basic terms among a large 
number of States that terrorism violates public international law. Moreover, there continues to be strenuous 
disagreement among States about what actions do or do not constitute terrorism, nor have we shaken 
ourselves free of the cliché that ‘one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter.’”) (internal citations 
omitted); Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 795 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J., concurring) 
(“While this nation unequivocally condemns all terrorist attacks, that sentiment is not universal. Indeed, the 
nations of the world are so divisively split on the legitimacy of such aggression as to make it impossible to 
pinpoint an area of harmony or consensus . . . Given this division, I do not believe that under current law 
terrorist attacks amount to law of nations violations.”).  
25 See Colangelo, supra 23, at 186; see also Alexander Urbelis, Rethinking Extraterritorial Prosecution in 
the War on Terror: Examining the Unintentional Yet Foreseeable Consequences of Extraterritorially 
Criminalizing the Provision of Material Support to Terrorists and Foreign Terrorist Organizations, 22 
CONN. J. INT’L L. 313, 324 (2007). 
26 See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, Pub. L. No. 104–32, 110 Stat 1214, § 301(a)(2) (“the 
Constitution confers upon Congress the power to punish crimes against the law of nations and to carry out 
the treaty obligations of the United States, and therefore Congress may by law impose penalties relating to 
the provision of material support to foreign organizations engaged in terrorist activity;”). 
27 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
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but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.”28 Although 
Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion in National Federation of Independent Business v. 
Sebelius walked back the Court’s expansive interpretation of the Necessary and Proper 
Clause,29 Congress nonetheless retains broad extraterritorial powers to implement U.S. 
treaty obligations. Because the United States is a party to a range of multilateral 
conventions prohibiting certain acts of terrorism—many of which have extraterritorial 
effect under so-called “extradite or prosecute” provisions—the Necessary and Proper 
Clause gives Congress the authority necessary to regulate the “bombing of public places, 
infrastructure, transportation systems, airports and aircraft, as well as [the] hijacking [of] 
aircraft, [and] hostage taking.”30 While Congress could frame some of the provisions of 
18 U.S.C. § 2339B, such as its prohibition on providing “currency or monetary 
instruments or financial securities [or] financial services” to a designated terrorist 
organization, as the necessary and proper implementation of the United States’ treaty 
obligations,31 other extraterritorial provisions, such as its broad prohibition on “expert 
advice” to terrorist organizations, lack apparent justification in any treaty to which the 
United States is a party. Nonetheless, given the breadth of Congress’s powers under the 
Necessary and Proper Clause, it seems highly unlikely that a foreign national bringing a 
facial challenge against such a provision would prevail.  
 
  3. Foreign Commerce Clause 
 
 Congress’s tertiary basis for 18 U.S.C. § 2339B is its power under Article I, 
Section 8, Clause 3 of the Constitution “[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations.”32 
Specifically, Congress noted the effect of terrorism on international trade, market 
stability, and international travel.33 Although Congress’s power to regulate interstate 
commerce has been interpreted quite broadly,34 the extent of its authority to regulate 
                                                
28 M’Culloch v. State of Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 421 (1819).  
29 National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
30 Colangelo, supra note 23, at 176–77 (citing the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist 
Bombings art. 2, Dec. 15, 1997, G.A. Res. 52/164; the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of 
Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation (Supplementary to the Convention for the 
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation) art. 2, Feb. 24, 1988, S. Treaty Doc. 
No. 100-19, 27 I.L.M. 627; the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of 
Civil Aviation art. 1, Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 565, 974 U.N.T.S. 178; the Convention for the Suppression 
of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft art. 1, Dec. 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641, 860 U.N.T.S. 105; and the 
International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages art. 1, T.I.A.S. No. 11,081, Dec. 17, 1979, 1136 
U.N.T.S. 205). 
31 For instance, Congress could argue that prohibiting the provision of currency, monetary instruments, 
financial securities, and financial services to terrorist organizations is necessary and proper for Congress to 
implement the United States’ obligations under the International Convention for the Suppression of the 
Financing of Terrorism, G.A. Res. 54/109, U.N. Doc. A/54/49 (1999). 
32 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, Pub. L. No. 104–32, 110 Stat 1214, § 301(a)(4) 
(“international terrorism affects the interstate and foreign commerce of the United States by harming 
international trade and market stability, and limiting international travel by United States citizens as well as 
foreign visitors to the United States;”).  
33 Id.  
34 See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (permitting Congress to regulate local activity that is 
not itself commerce as long as, in aggregate, that activity exerts a substantial effect on interstate 
commerce). But see United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (limiting Congress’s commerce powers to 
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commerce with foreign nations is, by comparison, relatively ill-defined. As the Ninth 
Circuit has said,” [i]t is not so much that the contours of the Foreign Commerce Clause 
are crystal clear, but rather that their scope has yet to be subjected to judicial scrutiny.”35  
 
 There is reason to believe that Congress’s power to regulate commerce with 
foreign nations should not be construed in the same way as its authority to regulate 
commerce amongst the states. As the Supreme Court has noted, there are structural 
differences between the federal government’s relationship with the states and its 
relationship with other sovereign nations;36 after all, unlike the states, foreign nations did 
not submit any of their sovereign powers to Congress in the Constitution.37 Other clues to 
the limitations of Congress’s power under the Foreign Commerce Clause may be found 
in its text. For one, the clause refers to commerce “with,” rather than “amongst,” foreign 
nations.38 This, Professor Colangelo has argued, suggests that an extraterritorial activity 
must have some nexus to the United States in order for Congress to regulate it.39 This 
reading of the text would also comport with the Framers’ well-documented concern about 
not unduly interfering in the affairs of foreign sovereigns.40 Moreover, if a nexus to the 
United States were not required, then, as Professor Eugene Kontorovich has noted, the 
Foreign Commerce Clause would have conferred on Congress broad universal powers, 
                                                                                                                                            
the regulation of commercial activity or activity that substantially affects interstate commerce); United 
States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (preventing Congress from using its commerce powers to regulate 
non-economic activity that has traditionally been regulated by the states, even if that non-economic activity 
in aggregate has a substantial effect on interstate commerce). 
35 United States v. Clark, 435 F.3d 1100, 1102 (9th Cir. 2006) (as quoted by Colangelo, supra note 23, at 
146). 
36 Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 448 (1979) (“Although the Constitution, Art. I, 
§ 8, cl. 3, grants Congress power to regulate commerce ‘with foreign Nations’ and ‘among the several 
States’ in parallel phrases, there is evidence that the Founders intended the scope of the foreign commerce 
power to be the greater.”); id. at 448 n.13 (“ . . . Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce may be 
restricted by considerations of federalism and state sovereignty. It has never been suggested that Congress’s 
power to regulate foreign commerce could be so limited.”); Board of Trustees of University of Illinois v. 
United States, 289 U.S. 48, 57 (“The principle of duality in our system of government does not touch the 
authority of the Congress in the regulation of foreign commerce.”). 
37 Yunis, 681 F. Supp. at 907 (“Certainly Congress has plenary power to regulate the flow of commerce 
within the boundaries of United States territory. But it is not empowered to regulate foreign commerce 
which has no connection to the United States. Unlike the states, foreign nations have never submitted to the 
sovereignty of the United States government nor ceded their regulatory powers to the United States.”); see 
also Colangelo, supra note 23, at 149. 
38 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
39 Colangelo, supra note 23, at 147 (arguing that the “use of the word ‘with’ in the Clause’s phrase ‘with 
foreign Nations’ indicates on its face some U.S. connection to the commerce that is the subject of federal 
regulation.”).  
40 See, e.g., The Antelope, 23 U.S. 66, 122 (1825) (Chief Justice Marshall explaining that because of “the 
perfect equality of nations . . . . no [nation] can rightfully impose a rule on another. Each legislates for 
itself, but its legislation can operate on itself alone.”); Alexander Hamilton, CAMILLUS XXXVI (“Congress 
. . . may regulate, by law, our own trade and that which foreigners come to carry on with us; but they 
cannot regulate the trade which we may go to carry on in foreign countries; they can give to us no rights, no 
privileges, there. This must depend on the will and regulations of those countries; and, consequently, it is 
the province of the power of treaty to establish the rules of commercial intercourse between foreign nations 
and the United States. The legislative may regulate our own trade, but treaty only can regulate the national 
trade between our own and another country”); see Colangelo, supra note 23, at 149. 
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which seems unlikely given how uncontroversial the clause was at the time of its 
drafting, in contrast to its interstate cousin, which was the subject of fierce debate.41  
 
 Nonetheless, it is highly improbable that a foreign national could successfully 
contest the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 2339B under the Foreign Commerce Clause. 
Given how broadly the Supreme Court has interpreted Congress’s interstate commerce 
powers, even if Congress’s foreign commerce authority is more limited, it does not seem 
unreasonable that Congress could have the power to proscribe terrorist acts overseas that 
have a substantial effect on the United States’ commerce with foreign nations. Instead, as 
Part II will argue, foreign nationals prosecuted for providing material support to a foreign 
terrorist organization overseas are more likely to prevail by arguing that the 
extraterritorial application of 18 U.S.C. § 2339B to their specific conduct is arbitrary or 
fundamentally unfair and, therefore, violates the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. 
 
 B. International Customary Bases of Extraterritorial Prescriptive Jurisdiction 
 
 Although the U.S. Constitution does not require Congress to comply with 
international law, the First, Third, Fifth, and Eleventh circuits, as Part III will explain,  
have suggested that courts should look to international law to assess whether a foreign 
national had fair warning that he or she could be extraterritorially subjected to U.S. law.42 
Thus, an analysis of the current circuit split in federal choice of law standards in 
extraterritorial prosecutions of foreign nationals must explain the bounds of customary 
international law in permitting criminal jurisdiction beyond a state’s borders. 
 
 Under international law, a state may only apply its national law extraterritorially 
when that state has so-called “prescriptive jurisdiction” under one of five recognized 
bases or principles43:  
                                                
41 See Eugene Kontorovich, Foreign Commerce Authority for Universal Jurisdiction over Terrorists, THE 
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY, Jan. 9, 2013, http://www.volokh.com/2013/01/09/the-material-support-statute-a-
neutrality-act-for-everyone/. Professor Kontorovich also notes that, even if one were to argue that Congress 
is not restricted by the Constitution in regulating activities overseas, it is unlikely that Congress possesses 
any inherent sovereign power to regulate foreign commerce that does not have a nexus to the United States 
because no other sovereign nation claims such an expansive right. Id. 
42 See, e.g., Yunis, 924 F.2d at 1091 (“Yunis seeks to portray international law as a self-executing code that 
trumps domestic law whenever the two conflict. That effort misconceives the role of judges as appliers of 
international law and as participants in the federal system. Our duty is to enforce the Constitution, laws, 
and treaties of the United States, not to conform the law of the land to norms of customary international 
law.”); Yousef, 327 F.3d at 86 (“In determining whether Congress intended a federal statute to apply to 
overseas conduct, an act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other 
possible construction remains. Nonetheless, in fashioning the reach of our criminal law, Congress is not 
bound by international law. If it chooses to do so, it may legislate with respect to conduct outside the 
United States, in excess of the limits posed by international law.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). In 
any event, the Charming Betsy canon dictates that a statute shall not be construed as violating the law of 
nations unless there is no other possible construction. See Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 
64, 118 (1804) (“It has also been observed that an act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate 
the law of nations if any other possible construction remains . . . .”). 
43 See, e.g., Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 815 (1993) (explaining that the “‘the law of 
nations,’ or customary international law, includes limitations on a nation’s exercise of its jurisdiction to 
prescribe.”); Curtis A. Bradley, Universal Jurisdiction and U.S. Law, 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 323 (2001) 
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• (1) Territorial Principle - Under the territorial principle, a state may regulate acts 
that occur or take effect, wholly or in substantial part, within its borders.44 This 
principle is often described as encompassing two distinct sub-principles. The 
subjective territorial principle permits the state to regulate acts that are 
commenced within its territory, but are consummated or completed outside its 
borders.45 By contrast, the objective territorial principle, often called the “effects” 
doctrine, allows a state to regulate acts that take effect within its territory even if 
they are physically committed outside of its borders.46 
 
• (2) Nationality Principle – The nationality principle permits a state to regulate the 
activities, interests, status, or relations of its citizens even when they are beyond 
the territory of the state.47  
 
• (3) Protective Principle – The protective principle, which could be conceived of 
as a form of the objective territorial principle, permits a state to extraterritorially 
regulate acts that are directed against the security of the state or other 
governmental functions so long as those acts are “generally recognized as crimes 
by developed legal systems.”48  
                                                                                                                                            
(“Unless a nation’s extraterritorial law falls within one of five categories—territoriality, nationality, 
protective principle, passive personality, or universality—it is said, the nation violates international law 
rules governing prescriptive jurisdiction.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). This five part categorization, 
based on state practice and opinio juris, is most often credited to an influential Harvard research project. 
See Harvard Research in International Law, Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, 29 AM. J. OF INT’L L. SUPP. 
439, 445 (1935) (“An analysis . . . discloses five general principles on which a more or less extensive penal 
jurisdiction is claimed by States at the present time. These five general principles are: first, the territorial 
principle, determining jurisdiction by reference to the place where the offence is committed; second, the 
nationality principle, determining jurisdiction by reference to the nationality or national character of the 
person committing the offence; third, the protective principle, determining jurisdiction by reference to the 
national interest injured by the offence; fourth, the universality principle, determining jurisdiction by 
reference to the custody of the person committing the offence; and fifth, the passive personality principle, 
determining jurisdiction by reference to the nationality or national character of the person injured by the 
offence. Of these five principles, the first is everywhere regarded as of primary importance and of 
fundamental character. The second is universally accepted, though there are striking differences in the 
extent to which it is used in different national systems. The third is claimed by most States, regarded with 
misgivings in a few, and generally ranked as the basis for an auxiliary competence. The fourth is widely 
though by no means universally accepted as the basis of an auxiliary competence, except for the offence of 
piracy, with respect to which it is the generally recognized principle of jurisdiction. The fifth, asserted in 
some form by a considerable number of States and contested by others, is admittedly auxiliary in character 
and is probably not essential for any State if the ends served are adequately provided for on other 
principles.”). 
44 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402 (1987). 
45 See id. at § 402(1)(a). 
46 See id. at § 402(1)(c) cmt. d. 
47 See id. at § 402(2). 
48 See id. at § 402(3) cmt. f (“Subsection (3) restates the protective principle of jurisdiction [which is] the 
right of a state to punish a limited class of offenses committed outside its territory by persons who are not 
its nationals—offenses directed against the security of the state or other offenses threatening the integrity of 
governmental functions that are generally recognized as crimes by developed legal systems, e.g., 
espionage, counterfeiting of the state’s seal or currency, falsification of official documents, as well as 
perjury before consular officials, and conspiracy to violate the immigration or customs laws. The protective 
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• (4) Passive Personality Principle – Under the passive personality principle, a state 
may regulate acts committed against its nationals anywhere in the world.49  
 
• (5) Universality Principle – Even if none of the previous four principles is 
present, the universality principle permits a state to extraterritorially regulate acts 
of “universal concern,” which include “piracy, slave trade, attacks on or hijacking 
of aircraft, genocide, war crimes, and perhaps certain acts of terrorism.”50 
 
 In addition to requiring that a state’s exercise of extraterritorial criminal 
jurisdiction fall into one of these five categories, the Restatement (Third) maintains that 
any exercise of jurisdiction under the first four categories—territorial, nationality, 
protective, and passive personality—must be reasonable. The Restatement evaluates 
reasonableness according to a number of factors, including the nexus between the 
regulating state’s territory and the regulated act; the nexus between the regulating state 
and the person committing the regulated act; the importance of the regulation to the 
regulating state; the importance of the regulation to the international political, legal, or 
economic system; the extent to which the regulation is consistent with the traditions of 
the international system; as well as the extent to which another state may have an interest 
in regulating the act and the likelihood of conflict with the regulation of another state.51 
Nonetheless, it remains unclear whether reasonableness is actually a requirement under 
customary international law.52 
 
II. Due Process Limitations on the Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Criminal Law 
 
A. The Extraterritorial Reach of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause 
 
 In light of the Constitution’s grant of broad powers to Congress to regulate 
extraterritorial conduct, alien defendants in extraterritorial material support to terrorism 
cases could more successfully argue that the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause 
imposes limitations on the government’s power to apply 18 U.S.C. § 2339B to them 
specifically. The possibility of foreign nationals invoking due process to contest the 
extraterritorial application of federal law in this way first gained serious traction in a 
1992 article by Professors Lea Brilmayer and Charles Norchi.53 Drawing a parallel to the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, which is often invoked by citizens of one 
state to prevent the overreach of another state’s long-arm statute, Professors Brilmayer 
                                                                                                                                            
principle may be seen as a special application of the effects principle . . . but it has been treated as an 
independent basis of jurisdiction.”). 
49 See id. at § 402 cmt. g.  
50 See id. at § 404.  
51 See id. at § 403(2). The Restatement makes clear that this list of factors is not exhaustive. Id. at § 403(2) 
cmt. b. 
52 See, e.g., Phillip R. Trimble, The Supreme Court and International Law: The Demise of Restatement 
Section 403, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 53, 54 (1995) (arguing that “U.S. prescriptive jurisdiction has never been as 
sharply limited as suggested by section 403.”).  
53 Lea Brilmayer & Charles Norchi, Federal Extraterritoriality and Fifth Amendment Due Process, 105 
HARV. L. REV. 1217, 1223 (1992). 
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and Norchi argued that alien defendants could find similar refuge from the extraterritorial 
overreach of U.S. law in the Fifth Amendment.54 Foreign nationals are entitled to the 
protections of the Fifth Amendment, according to this theory, because it modified Article 
I’s grant of extraterritorial powers to Congress and—in contrast to the more restrictive 
language of the Fourth Amendment (“the People”)—broadly extended these protections 
to “any person,” which by its natural meaning includes foreign nationals overseas.55 
Although they acknowledged that the Supreme Court had never addressed the issue, and 
in fact had only recently declined to extend the Fourth Amendment’s protections to 
extraterritorial searches and seizures by U.S. officials, Professors Brilmayer and Norchi 
argued that the identical texts of, and similar purposes behind, the Constitution’s two Due 
Process Clauses should persuade the Supreme Court to extend due process protections to 
alien defendants against federal extraterritorial overreach.56  
 
 The Supreme Court’s opinion in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez probably 
presents the greatest obstacle to the theory of Professors Brilmayer and Norchi. In 
Verdugo-Urquidez, the Court declined to extend the Fourth Amendment’s protection 
against unreasonable searches and seizures to a foreign national whose home in Mexico 
had been searched without a warrant by a team of U.S. and Mexican law enforcement 
officials.57 In holding that the Fourth Amendment’s reference to “the People” is only 
intended to include “the People of the United States,” Chief Justice Rehnquist’s plurality 
opinion, joined by Justices White, O’Connor, and Scalia, reasoned that the Insular Cases 
only guarantee “fundamental” constitutional rights to foreign nationals in unincorporated 
U.S. territory, so a foreign national’s invocation of the Fourth Amendment with respect to 
a search and seizure on foreign soil is highly suspect. 58  Moreover, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist noted that the Court had declined to extend Fifth Amendment protections to 
alien enemy combatants in Eisentrager, despite the fact that the Fifth Amendment’s 
reference to “any person” is seemingly more universal than the Fourth Amendment’s 
reference to “the People.”59 By this reasoning, the plurality declined to extend the 
protections of the Fourth Amendment to alien defendants in extraterritorial prosecutions, 
even though, as Justice Brennan’s dissent observed, the plurality had no objection to 
extending the obligation to comply with U.S. law to those same defendants.60  
 
 Nonetheless, it was Justice Kennedy’s fifth vote that controlled Verdugo-
Urquidez and his concurring opinion seemingly left the door open to extending Fifth 
Amendment due process rights to aliens prosecuted for extraterritorial conduct.61 In 
agreeing that the Fourth Amendment’s protections do not extend to foreign nationals 
                                                
54 Id. 
55 See id. at 1236. 
56 Id. at 1223. 
57 United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990). 
58 Id. at 268 (citing Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138, 146 (1904)). 
59 Id. at 269 (citing Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 770 (1950)).  
60 Id. at 282 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“The Court today creates an antilogy: the Constitution authorizes our 
Government to enforce our criminal laws abroad, but when Government agents exercise this authority, the 
Fourth Amendment does not travel with them. This cannot be. At the very least, the Fourth Amendment is 
an unavoidable correlative of the Government’s power to enforce the criminal law.”). 
61 Id. at 278 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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outside the United States, Justice Kennedy declined to endorse the plurality’s textual 
argument; instead, Justice Kennedy, citing Justice Harlan’s concurrence in Reid v. 
Covert, argued that the Court should reject the defendant’s claim because “[t]he 
conditions and considerations of this case would make adherence to the Fourth 
Amendment’s warrant requirement impracticable and anomalous.”62 To Justice Kennedy, 
it was the practical difficulties of executing a search warrant overseas that militated 
against extending the Fourth Amendment’s protections to foreign nationals. Professors 
Brilmayer and Norchi have argued that Justice Kennedy’s reasoning distinguishes 
Verdugo-Urquidez from the Fifth Amendment question because, as Justice Kennedy 
himself suggested, extending the Fourth Amendment’s search and seizure protections to 
foreign nationals in extraterritorial cases is significantly more impracticable than 
recognizing that foreign nationals in extraterritorial prosecutions are protected by the 
Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.63 As a result, if the Fifth Amendment question 
ever does reach the Court, one could fairly anticipate that Justice Kennedy might take a 
practicality-driven approach to recognizing an alien defendant’s due process rights, 
especially in light of his opinion in Boumediene v. Bush, which framed the Court’s 
jurisprudence on the extraterritorial reach of the Constitution, from the Insular Cases to 
Eisentrager to Reid, as turning on “practical considerations.”64    
 
 Nevertheless, even if the theory of Professors Brilmayer and Norchi survives 
Verdugo-Urquidez, there are other arguments against recognizing due process limitations 
on the extraterritorial reach of U.S. law. Most notably, Professor Mark Weisburd has 
argued that extending the protections of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause to 
alien defendants in extraterritorial prosecutions would “den[y] to the United States a 
degree of authority recognized and asserted by most of the other nations of the world.”65 
This, Professor Weisburd has claimed, would contradict the Supreme Court’s declaration 
in Curtiss-Wright that “the right and power of the United States . . . are equal to the right 
and power of the other members of the international family. Otherwise, the United States 
is not completely sovereign.”66 Moreover, Professor Weisburd has argued that there are 
legitimate differences between the sovereign powers of U.S. states and the federal 
government that militate against imposing similar due process limitations on their 
extraterritorial powers; for instance, in contrast to the federal government, U.S. states do 
not have foreign affairs or war powers and they have only limited authority to regulate 
commerce outside their territory.67 Lastly, Professor Weisburd has noted that if the 
Framers had intended for the Fifth Amendment to modify Article I’s broad grant of 
                                                
62 Id.; see Colangelo, supra note 23, at 161 (discussing Justice Kennedy’s context-driven approach in 
Verdugo-Urquidez). 
63 Brilmayer and Norchi, supra note 53, at 1236 (“The Fourth Amendment is unique in that evident 
difficulties exist with satisfying it in international cases, because it is unclear to whom the police would 
apply for a warrant to conduct a foreign search.”); Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 278 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring) (“All would agree, for instance, that the dictates of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment protect the defendant.”). 
64 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 762 (2008). 
65  A. Mark Weisburd, Due Process Limits on Federal Extraterritorial Legislation?, 35 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 379, 383 (1997). 
66 Id. at 383 (citing United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936)). 
67 Id. at 408–17. 
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extraterritorial authority to Congress, one would expect this to have been the subject of a 
contentious debate, but there is no record of the Framers discussing the issue.68 
 
 Although Professor Weisburd has raised serious questions about the Fifth 
Amendment’s extraterritorial reach, the context of the debate over the extraterritorial 
reach of the Fifth Amendment has changed tremendously since Professors Brilmayer, 
Norchi, and Weisburd engaged this issue in the 1990s. After a decade of Guantanamo 
habeas corpus decisions, one could argue that the Supreme Court has become 
increasingly skeptical of the sovereigntist theory that the Constitution does not constrain 
the U.S. government abroad.69 Moreover, the seven circuits that have addressed this 
question have uniformly assumed that the protections of the Fifth Amendment’s Due 
Process Clause extend to foreign nationals in extraterritorial prosecutions.70 The dearth of 
instances in which these circuits have found that the extraterritorial application of U.S. 
law to foreign nationals violated their due process rights suggests that Professor 
Weisburd’s fears of the courts unnecessarily constraining the United States’ sovereign 
powers are unfounded. Regardless, until the Supreme Court decides otherwise, the fact 
that the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause imposes limitations on federal choice of 
law in extraterritorial prosecutions like United States v. Ahmed seems more or less 
beyond dispute. 
 
B. Establishing a Due Process Standard in Extraterritorial Prosecutions 
 
 If one agrees that the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments impose similar constraints on the extraterritorial application of federal and 
state law, respectively, then the most logical starting point for a federal choice of law test 
is the Supreme Court’s Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague state choice of law standard.71  In 
Allstate, the widow of a Wisconsin man, who was killed in a motorcycle accident in 
Wisconsin but was employed in Minnesota, moved to Minnesota and sued her late 
husband’s insurance company under Minnesota law, despite the fact that the accident 
took place in Wisconsin, all parties involved were Wisconsin residents at the time, and 
the insurance contract was concluded in Wisconsin. 72  In affirming the Minnesota 
Supreme Court’s decision to apply Minnesota law to the controversy, the U.S. Supreme 
Court, in a plurality opinion by Justice Brennan, held that, for a state’s substantive law to 
be selected in a manner consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause 
and Article IV’s Full Faith and Credit Clause, the “State must have a significant contact 
or significant aggregation of contacts, creating state interests, such that choice of its law 
                                                
68 Id. at 408. 
69 See, e.g., Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 727 (explaining, in the context of the applicability of habeas corpus at 
the Guantanamo Bay detention camp, that “[t]he Nation’s basic charter cannot be contracted away like this 
. . . . To hold that the political branches may switch the Constitution on or off at will would lead to a regime 
in which they, not this Court, say ‘what the law is.’”). 
70 See Colangelo, supra note 23, at 201 n.3 (noting that “courts that have considered the matter have 
uniformly held that such limits do exist, though they have been divided on what precisely the limits 
entail.”). 
71 Brilmayer and Norchi, supra note 53, at 1239. 
72 Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 303 (1981). 
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is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair.”73 Although only three other justices joined 
Justice Brennan’s Allstate opinion, a majority of the Court, noting that “[t]he dissenting 
justices [in Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague] were in substantial agreement with this principle,” 
ratified Justice Brennan’s standard as controlling precedent four years later.74 
 
 The highly permissive choice of law standard that the Supreme Court established 
in Allstate has been controversial. In addition to what some commentators have viewed as 
the Court’s conflation of two distinct inquiries, one under the Due Process Clause and the 
other under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, 75 others have criticized Allstate for 
evaluating due process—traditionally thought of as an individual right—by looking to the 
state’s contacts with the controversy and the state’s interests arising from those 
contacts.76 This, some legal scholars have claimed, unfairly emphasizes state sovereignty 
interests at the expense of individual liberty.77 Moreover, it gives less scrutiny to choice 
of law than personal jurisdiction, even though how a court decides a controversy is 
almost certainly more important for fairness purposes than where a court decides it.78 
 
 By contrast, in an earlier choice of law case, Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, the Supreme 
Court had seemed more concerned about the reasonable expectations of the defendant 
than the interests of the regulating state, although its analysis of each was closely 
intertwined.79 In Dick, a nominal permanent resident of Texas, who was at the time 
domiciled in Mexico, brought suit in Texas to garnish the property of a New York 
corporation that had reinsured an insurance policy issued in Mexico, covering a risk in 
                                                
73 Allstate, 449 U.S. at 312–13. 
74 See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 818–19 (1985). 
75 See, e.g., Thomas O. Main, On Teaching Conflicts and Why I Dislike Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague, 12 
NEV. L. J. 600 (2012) (“My principal criticism, then, is the Court's analytical framework: the collapse of 
two distinct constitutional questions into one . . . . Whether unprecedented or simply unusual, the 
combination of the Due Process and Full Faith and Credit Clauses into a single test in conflicts cases is 
unfortunate and problematic.”). 
76 See, e.g., Scott Fruehwald, Constitutional Constraints on State Choice of Law, 24 U. DAYTON L. REV. 39, 
57 (1998) (“. . . Allstate inappropriately emphasizes state sovereignty interests at the expense of fairness to 
defendants. The problem with this emphasis on state interests is that due process has nothing to do with the 
relations among the states (horizontal federalism); rather, due process concerns the relationship of a state to 
the individual.”) (citation omitted). 
77 Id. (“The Court’s due process analysis for choice of law ignores general principles of due process 
analysis and allows states to treat individuals unfairly . . . . Allstate stresses state interests over individual 
liberty interests, contravening the purpose of the Due Process Clause—the protection of individual liberty . 
. . . ”) (citation omitted). 
78 See P. John Kozyris, Reflections on Allstate - The Lessening of Due Process in Choice of Law, 14 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV 889, 891–92 (1981) (“State overreaching into the legislative domain of other states is 
potentially more destructive of the goals of federalism and more prejudicial to the rights of defendants than 
the concurrent jurisdiction of the courts of different states. After all, how to decide a case is more important 
than where to decide it.”); Fruehwald, supra note 76, at 56–57 (“. . . the Court should not give personal 
jurisdiction greater scrutiny than choice of law, as is presently the case . . . . because the governing law 
directly affects the trial’s outcome while personal jurisdiction mainly involves convenience . . . . ‘[t]o 
believe that a defendant’s contacts with the forum should be stronger under the Due Process Clause for 
jurisdictional purposes than for choice of law is to believe that an accused is more concerned about where 
he will be hanged than whether [he will be].’”) (quoting Linda Silberman, Shaffer v. Heitner: The End of an 
Era, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 33, 88 (1978)). 
79 Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930). 
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Mexico, and assigned by a Mexican insurer to a Mexican national.80 In holding that the 
application of Texas law to the controversy violated the due process rights of the New 
York reinsurer, the Supreme Court noted that “nothing in any way relating to the policy 
sued on, or to the contracts of reinsurance, was ever done or required to be done in 
Texas.”81 The Court emphasized that the New York garnishees were not asking for any 
special favors in contesting the application of Texas law, but asking “only to be let 
alone.”82 Although somewhat sparse in its due process analysis and silent on its standard, 
the Court’s reasoning in Dick, in contrast to Allstate, did not mix analysis of the Due 
Process Clause with the Full Faith and Credit Clause. Nonetheless, in establishing its 
state choice of law standard, Allstate framed Dick as turning on Texas’ minimal contacts 
with the controversy and Texas’ insignificant interests arising from those contacts, rather 
than on individual fairness to the New York defendant.83      
 
 Perhaps for this reason, Professors Brilmayer and Norchi chose the Court’s 
Allstate decision rather than Dick as the initial basis for their proposed federal choice of 
law test, which maintains that due process requires minimum contacts with the United 
States, U.S. interests arising from those contacts, and fairness to the defendant.84 To 
fulfill the first prong, the authors argued that, like state choice of law doctrine, 
“something about the controversy or the defendant must touch the forum,”85 except in 
cases of jus cogens crimes subject to universal jurisdiction because the law of nations 
permits any state to prosecute the offender.86 Professors Brilmayer and Norchi conceded 
that the second prong—state interests arising from contacts—is vague even in the state 
choice of law context, but they suggested that this would be met by any affirmative 
constitutional basis for Congress to regulate the extraterritorial activity in question, such 
as its commerce or foreign affairs powers. 87  Thus, the authors predicted that the 
prosecution of foreign nationals for overseas conduct would typically survive the U.S. 
interests prong because, if Congress lacked any affirmative basis to regulate the activity, 
the statute would be facially invalid.88 
 
 While Professors Brilmayer and Norchi did not acknowledge it as such, their third 
prong—individual fairness—appeared to constitute a departure from the Allstate 
standard, which emphasized forum state contacts and interests, and a step closer to Dick, 
which seemed more concerned about the expectations of the defendant. Professors 
Brilmayer and Norchi argued that this third prong is the most elusive and demanding for 
Fifth Amendment purposes.89 They maintained that it requires something more than fair 
                                                
80 Id. at 402. 
81 Id. at 407–08. 
82 Id. at 410. 
83 Allstate, 449 U.S. at 310–11 (“Dick . . . stand[s] for the proposition that if a State has only an 
insignificant contact with the parties and the occurrence or transaction, application of its law is 
unconstitutional. Dick concluded that nominal residence—standing alone—was inadequate [for the 
application of Texas law to be consistent with due process];”). 
84 Brilmayer and Norchi, supra note 53, at 1242. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. at 1254. 
87 Id. at 1243. 
88 Id.  
89 Id. 
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warning that the foreign national might be subject to U.S. law because otherwise “the 
fairness requirement would be empty, for such notice could always be provided.”90 
Professors Brilmayer and Norchi suggested that an alternative approach might be whether 
the foreign national voluntary affiliated himself with the United States, such as by doing 
business in, or intending to do harm to, the United States. They noted that this approach 
reveals the interrelatedness of the contacts and fairness prongs, but maintained that both 
must be independently satisfied. Although they acknowledged that such an approach to 
individual fairness poses “numerous difficulties,” Professors Brilmayer and Norchi 
argued that it “captures some deeply held intuitions of Anglo-American political thought 
about fair subjection to sovereign power.”91  
 
III. The Circuit Split: The Nexus v. Notice Due Process Tests 
 
 Today there is a great deal of confusion in the circuits over the limitations that the 
Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause imposes on federal choice of law in 
extraterritorial prosecutions of foreign nationals. All seven of the circuits that have 
addressed this question have presumed that these alien defendants can invoke the Fifth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause and each of these circuits has, in one form or another, 
incorporated Allstate’s arbitrary or fundamentally unfair standard. However, the circuits 
are split over the appropriate test by which to determine if the extraterritorial application 
of U.S. law to an alien is arbitrary or fundamentally unfair. Admittedly, categorizing the 
circuits’ competing standards can be challenging since, in a number of these cases, courts 
either have neglected to provide a substantive explanation of their reasoning in adopting a 
certain standard or have approached the due process issue by analyzing Congress’s 
authority to enact the statute with extraterritorial effect rather than inquiring into whether 
the statute was applied to the defendant consistent with due process. Nonetheless, a 
survey of the circuits reveals that three—the Second, Fourth, and Ninth—employ a 
“nexus” due process test that examines whether the alien defendant or his conduct has 
had, is having, or will have some connection to, or some impact on, the United States.92 
By contrast, the other four circuits that have addressed this issue—the First, Third, Fifth, 
and Eleventh—apply some form of a “notice” due process test, which inquires into 
whether the alien defendant had fair warning that the United States could prosecute him 
under U.S. law for his overseas conduct.93 To determine if there is notice, these circuits 
have typically looked to whether customary international legal principles provide a basis 
for the United States to exercise extraterritorial prescriptive jurisdiction over the 
defendant’s activity such that the defendant had fair warning. 
  
 A. The Nexus Test 
  
  1. Ninth Circuit 
                                                
90 Id. 
91 Id. at 1244. 
92 Charles Doyle, Extraterritorial Application of American Criminal Law, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH 
SERVICE 6 (Feb. 15, 2012). 
93 See Brian Lichter, The Offences Clause, Due Process, and the Extraterritorial Reach of Federal 
Criminal Law in Narco-Terrorism Prosecutions, 103 NW. L. REV. 1929, 1942 (2009). 
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 The Ninth Circuit was the first to articulate the nexus due process test for alien 
defendants in extraterritorial prosecutions.94 In United States v. Davis, a foreign national 
in a foreign-flagged vessel stopped by the U.S. Coast Guard in international waters off 
the coast of California was charged with trafficking drugs in violation of the Maritime 
Drug Law Enforcement Act (MDLEA).95 The defendant invoked the Fifth Amendment’s 
Due Process Clause to contest the application of the statute to his extraterritorial conduct. 
After upholding Congress’s authority to define and punish such conduct on the high seas 
under Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution, the Ninth Circuit, without any analysis as to 
why the Fifth Amendment granted the defendant due process rights, assessed whether the 
application of the statute to the defendant was consistent with due process.96 The Court—
clearly invoking the language of Allstate without acknowledging it expressly—
determined that “[i]n order to apply extraterritorially a federal criminal statute to a 
defendant consistently with due process, there must be a sufficient nexus between the 
defendant and the United States . . . so that such application would not be arbitrary or 
fundamentally unfair.”97 In a footnote, the Court added that international law principles 
may be useful as a “rough guide” of whether a sufficient nexus to the United States 
exists.98 However, because the facts showed that the defendant intended to distribute the 
drugs in the United States, the Court determined without any reference to international 
law that a sufficient nexus existed such that the application of the MDLEA to Davis did 
not violate the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.99  
 
 In laying out its due process test, the Ninth Circuit did not, as Professors 
Brilmayer and Norchi would have liked, articulate any distinction between its inquiry 
into the defendant’s contact with the United States and its inquiry into fairness to the 
                                                
94 See Colangelo, supra note 23, at 162 (describing the Ninth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Davis as 
“the case that seems to have spawned the recent Fifth Amendment due process jurisprudence in this area . . 
. .”). Although the Davis Court cited its nexus test to United States v. Peterson, 812 F.2d 486 (9th Cir. 
1987), a case in which the Ninth Circuit affirmed Congress’s ability to proscribe drug trafficking in 
international waters, the Peterson Court did not actually consider a due process claim. Instead, the Court 
merely analyzed Congress’s ability to proscribe the extraterritorial conduct in question. See Peterson, 812 
F.2d at 493 (“We also reject appellants’ argument that [the U.S. anti-drug trafficking statute], so construed, 
is an improper and unconstitutional exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction. We conclude that there was 
more than a sufficient nexus with the United States to allow the exercise of jurisdiction. There was 
substantial evidence that the drugs were bound ultimately for the United States. Where an attempted 
transaction is aimed at causing criminal acts within the United States, there is a sufficient basis for the 
United States to exercise its jurisdiction to arrest and try the offenders.”); see also Dan E. Stigall, 
International Law and Limitations on the Exercise of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in U.S. Domestic Law, 
35 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 323, 348 (2012). 
95 United States v. Davis, 905 F.2d 245, 247 (9th Cir. 1990). 
96 Id. at 248 (“ . . . as a matter of constitutional law, we require that application of the statute to the acts in 
question not violate the due process clause of the fifth amendment [sic].”). 
97 Id. at 248–49 (citations omitted). 
98 Id. at 249 n.2 (“International law principles may be useful as a rough guide of whether a sufficient nexus 
exists between the defendant and the United States so that application of the statute in question would not 
violate due process. However, danger exists that emphasis on international law principles will cause us to 
lose sight of the ultimate question: would application of the statute to the defendant be arbitrary or 
fundamentally unfair?”). 
99 Id. at 249. 
 19 
defendant; instead, in determining the fairness of the extraterritorial application of U.S. 
law to the defendant, the Ninth Circuit’s approach seemed to more closely track the 
Allstate standard by looking to the United States’ contacts with the controversy and its 
interests arising from those contacts. Although the Ninth Circuit has not abandoned this 
standard, in the years since Davis it has explained that the nexus test serves the same 
purpose as the minimum contacts test in personal jurisdiction analysis because it ensures 
that only foreign nationals who should reasonably anticipate being haled into U.S. court 
are subjected to the extraterritorial application of U.S. law.100 Moreover, the Ninth Circuit 
has held that jus cogens crimes subject to universal jurisdiction are an exception to the 
Davis nexus standard because the universal condemnation of such conduct “puts [the 
offender] on notice that his acts will be prosecuted by any state where he is found.”101 
 
  2. Second Circuit 
 
 The Second Circuit first confronted the question of the due process limitations on 
federal choice of law in the prosecution of Ramzi Yousef, a Pakistani national who had 
orchestrated the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, on conspiracy charges for a 1995 
plot to bomb several U.S. airlines flying out of Manila.102 In United States v. Yousef, 
Yousef and his alien co-defendants challenged the application to their overseas conduct 
of several provisions of a federal law proscribing attempts to destroy aircraft in foreign 
air commerce.103 After affirming Congress’s authority to proscribe such extraterritorial 
conduct on both treaty and customary international legal grounds,104 the Second Circuit—
without analyzing why or how the Fifth Amendment recognizes the extraterritorial due 
process rights of foreign nationals—endorsed the Ninth Circuit’s Davis nexus test as the 
appropriate standard for determining whether the application of the statute was arbitrary 
                                                
100 See United States v. Klimavicius-Viloria, 144 F.3d 1249, 1257 (9th Cir. 1998) (“The nexus requirement 
serves the same purpose as the ‘minimum contacts’ test in personal jurisdiction. It ensures that a United 
States court will assert jurisdiction only over a defendant who ‘should reasonably anticipate being haled 
into court” in this country.’”) (quoting World–Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 
(1980)); see also United States v. Zakharov, 468 F.3d 1171, 1177 (9th Cir. 2006) (“Nexus is a 
constitutional requirement analogous to ‘minimum contacts’ in personal jurisdiction analysis . . . ”). 
101 United States v. Shi, 525 F.3d 709, 723 (9th Cir. 2008). This exception to the nexus requirement for 
crimes subject to universal jurisdiction is also endorsed by Professors Brilmayer and Norchi. See Brilmayer 
and Norchi, supra note 53, at 1254. Most significantly, this exception to the nexus test in the Ninth Circuit 
has allowed the United States to apply the MDLEA extraterritorially to flagless vessels trafficking 
narcotics. See, e.g., United States v. Caicedo, 47 F.3d 370, 373 (9th Cir.1995) (holding that due process did 
not require a nexus to extraterritorially prosecute alien defendants under the MDLEA who were trafficking 
narcotics on a flagless vessel in international waters because they were on notice that any state could 
prosecute them for their universally condemned conduct); United States v. Juda, 46 F.3d 961, 967 (9th Cir. 
1995) (rejecting the due process claim of an alien prosecuted extraterritorially under the MDLEA because 
the United States does not require any nexus to extraterritorially regulate the crimes of stateless vessels on 
the high seas). 
102 Yousef, 327 F.3d at 79; see Stigall, supra note 94, at 352. 
103 18 U.S.C.A. § 32. 
104  Specifically, the Second Circuit cited the Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts 
Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, to which the United States is a party, and the protective principle of 
extraterritorial prescriptive jurisdiction as bases for the United States to apply the statute overseas. See 
Yousef, 327 F.3d at 108–11. 
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or fundamentally unfair.105 In evaluating nexus, the Second Circuit’s analysis turned on 
the fact that the alien defendants had conspired to attack a dozen U.S.-flagged aircraft for 
the purpose of injuring Americans and influencing U.S. foreign policy. “Given the 
substantial intended effect of their attack on the United States and its citizens,” the Court 
reasoned, “it cannot be argued seriously that the defendants’ conduct was so unrelated to 
American interests as to render their prosecution in the United States arbitrary or 
fundamentally unfair.”106 Therefore, the Second Circuit held that the prosecution did not 
offend the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. The Second Circuit has continued to 
apply this nexus standard in the years since Yousef, including in prosecutions of foreign 
nationals for providing material support to terrorism.107  
 
  3. Fourth Circuit 
 
 The Fourth Circuit is the most recent to have adopted the nexus standard in 
extraterritorial prosecutions of foreign nationals.108 In United States v. Brehm, the Fourth 
Circuit was confronted with a due process challenge by a South African national who was 
prosecuted under the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act for stabbing a British 
national on a U.S. military base in Afghanistan.109 The Fourth Circuit, like the Second 
and Ninth circuits before it, assumed without offering support or analysis that the 
protections of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause extend to alien defendants in 
extraterritorial prosecutions.110 Moreover, the Fourth Circuit endorsed the nexus due 
process approach of Davis and Yousef as the appropriate standard for determining 
whether the extraterritorial application of U.S. law to the defendant was arbitrary or 
fundamentally unfair. Although the Fourth Circuit recognized that, in contrast to the 
defendants in Davis and Yousef, Brehm did not target his conduct towards the United 
                                                
105 Id. at 111 (“Our Circuit has not yet decided the extent to which the Due Process Clause limits the United 
States’ assertion of jurisdiction over criminal conduct committed outside our borders. The Ninth Circuit has 
held [in Davis] that ‘[i]n order to apply extraterritorially a federal criminal statute to a defendant 
consistently with due process, there must be a sufficient nexus between the defendant and the United 
States, so that such application would not be arbitrary or fundamentally unfair’ . . . . We agree.”) (citation 
omitted); see Colangelo, supra note 23, at 163 (discussing the Second Circuit’s adoption of the Davis 
standard in Yousef); see also Stigall, supra note 94, at 354. 
106 Yousef, 327 F.3d at 112. 
107 See, e.g., Stigall, supra note 94, at 355 (“This approach by the Second Circuit has remained constant, 
requiring a nexus between the defendant and the United States in order for the assertion of jurisdiction to 
satisfy due process.”); United States v. Al Kassar, 660 F.3d 108, 118 (2d Cir. 2011) (“In order to apply 
extraterritorially a federal criminal statute to a defendant consistently with due process, there must be a 
sufficient nexus between the defendant and the United States, so that such application would not be 
arbitrary or fundamentally unfair”). 
108 The Fourth Circuit first confronted the question of the extraterritorial due process rights of alien 
defendants in an unpublished opinion, United States v. Mohammad-Omar, 323 F. App’x 259, 260 (4th Cir. 
2009), which does not have binding precedential effect in the Fourth Circuit. Mohammad-Omar involved 
the prosecution of a foreign national for trafficking drugs overseas but with intent of distributing them in 
the United States. The Fourth Circuit, citing Davis and Yousef, affirmed that the defendant’s prosecution 
was consistent with due process because his intent to distribute narcotics in the United States created a 
sufficient nexus such that his prosecution was neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair. Id. at 261. 
109 United States v. Brehm, 691 F.3d 547 (4th Cir. 2012).  
110 Id. at 552 (“Though a criminal statute having extraterritorial reach is declared or conceded substantively 
valid under the Constitution, its enforcement in a particular instance must comport with due process.”). 
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States, the Court found that, because Brehm’s actions occurred on a U.S. military base 
while he was working under contract with the U.S. military, his conduct affected 
significant U.S. interests, including restoring law and order on the base, maintaining 
military discipline, and reallocating resources to confine Brehm, provide medical 
attention to his victim, and investigate the incident.111 The Fourth Circuit found this U.S. 
nexus sufficiently close that prosecuting Brehm under U.S. law was neither arbitrary nor 
fundamentally unfair and, therefore, was consistent with the Due Process Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment.112 
 
 B. The Notice Test 
  
  1. Third Circuit 
 
 After the Ninth Circuit’s Davis decision, the Third Circuit was the next to address 
the due process limitations on federal choice of law in extraterritorial prosecutions of 
foreign nationals. In United States v. Martinez-Hidalgo, a Colombian national who was 
prosecuted under the MDLEA after the U.S. Coast Guard found cocaine on his flagless 
vessel in international waters invoked the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause to 
challenge the application of the U.S. statute to his conduct.113 Although the Third Circuit, 
like the Ninth, assumed without further explanation that, to comport with the Fifth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause, the extraterritorial application of U.S. law to a foreign 
national must be neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair, the Third Circuit declined to 
follow Davis’ nexus approach.114 Instead, the Third Circuit seemed to implicitly invoke 
the concept of notice based on customary international legal principles of prescriptive 
jurisdiction by reasoning that the application of MDLEA to the alien defendant was not 
fundamentally unfair because “the trafficking of narcotics is condemned universally by 
law-abiding nations.”115 The Third Circuit suggested that a nexus to the United States 
might be required if the prescribed conduct were “generally lawful throughout the 
world”—presumably, although the Court did not say so expressly, because a foreign 
national would lack notice of the unlawfulness of his extraterritorial conduct under U.S. 
law—but the Court declined to decide that issue in Martinez-Hidalgo.116  
                                                
111 Id. at 552–53. 
112 Id. at 554. 
113 United States v. Martinez-Hidalgo, 993 F.2d 1052, 1053 (3d Cir. 1993). 
114 Id. at 1056 (“We further acknowledge that our conclusion that the government need not establish a 
domestic nexus to prosecute offenses under the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act is not reconcilable 
with some of the wording in the opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in United States v. 
Davis . . . . We decline to follow Davis . . .”). 
115 Id. Note that although the Third Circuit’s description of drug tracking as conduct “condemned 
universally by law-abiding nations” evokes the concept of universal jurisdiction, the category of crimes 
subject to universal jurisdiction is quite restrictive and it is doubtful that drug trafficking is included. See, 
e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 404 (1987) (“A state has jurisdiction to define 
and prescribe punishment for certain offenses recognized by the community of nations as of universal 
concern, such as piracy, slave trade, attacks on or hijacking of aircraft, genocide, war crimes, and perhaps 
certain acts of terrorism . . . .”). 
116 Martinez-Hidalgo, 993 F.2d at 1056 (“ . . . we acknowledge that there might be a due process problem if 
Congress provided for the extraterritorial application of United States law to conduct on the high seas 
without regard for a domestic nexus if that conduct were generally lawful throughout the world. But that is 
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 The Third Circuit reaffirmed this relatively ill-defined approach in United States 
v. Perez-Oviedo when it rejected the due process claims of a foreign national who was 
charged under the MDLEA after his Panamanian-flagged vessel was stopped by the U.S. 
Coast Guard in international waters.117 In evaluating whether the application of MDLEA 
to the defendant was arbitrary or fundamentally unfair, the Third Circuit, citing Martinez-
Hidalgo, once again noted that drug trafficking is universally condemned, thereby 
implying that the defendant had notice that his conduct would subject him to prosecution 
in some jurisdiction.118 Moreover, the Third Circuit viewed the defendant’s due process 
claims as particularly weak because, in contrast to the defendant in Martinez-Hidalgo 
who was stopped on a stateless vessel, the Government of Panama had consented to the 
U.S. Coast Guard’s boarding of the defendant’s Panamanian-flagged vessel. Adopting the 
(questionable) position that consent of the flagged nation gives the United States 
prescriptive extraterritorial jurisdiction under the territorial principle of customary 
international law, the Third Circuit held that the application of MDLEA to the alien 
defendant was neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair and, therefore, was consistent 
with the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.119 
 
  2. First Circuit  
 
 The First Circuit has adopted a similar approach to the extraterritorial due process 
rights of foreign nationals as the Third Circuit, but it is more explicit in looking to 
international legal principles of prescriptive jurisdiction to determine if the alien 
defendant had notice that the United States could prosecute him for his extraterritorial 
conduct. 120  The First Circuit initially articulated this standard in United States v. 
Cardales, a case in which Venezuelan nationals transporting narcotics on a Venezuelan-
flagged vessel in international waters were arrested by the U.S. Coast Guard and 
prosecuted under the MDLEA.121 The defendants appealed their convictions on the 
grounds that, because their conduct had no nexus to the United States, prosecuting them 
under U.S. law violated the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.122  
 
 The First Circuit endorsed Davis’ proposition that, to be consistent with due 
process, an extraterritorial application of U.S. can be neither arbitrary nor fundamentally 
unfair, but, like the Third Circuit, it expressly declined to adopt the Ninth Circuit’s nexus 
                                                                                                                                            
not the situation here.”); see Stigall, supra note 94, at 366 (“The holding [of Martinez-Hidalgo] clearly 
envisions that a nexus could be required under certain circumstances, but that, in the absence of a nexus, 
other factors (in this case, the ‘universal’ condemnation of the offense at issue) could make a detached 
exercise of jurisdiction acceptable.”). 
117 United States v. Perez-Oviedo, 281 F.3d 400, 401 (3d Cir. 2002). 
118 Id. 
119 Id. at 403 (“Perez-Oviedo’s state of facts presents an even stronger case for concluding that no due 
process violation occurred. The Panamanian government expressly consented to the application of the 
MDLEA (unlike the stateless vessel in Martinez–Hidalgo). Such consent from the flag nation eliminates a 
concern that the application of the MDLEA may be arbitrary or fundamentally unfair.”).  
120 Stigall, supra note 94, at 360. 
121 United States v. Cardales, 168 F.3d 548, 551 (1st Cir. 1999). 
122 Id. at 552. 
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requirement. 123  Instead, the First Circuit, citing to Davis’ footnote, reasoned that 
principles of international law should guide whether due process is satisfied.124 Because 
the Venezuelan government had consented to the U.S. Coast Guard’s boarding of the 
vessel, and because the Court reasoned that narcotics trafficking presents a threat to U.S. 
national security, the First Circuit determined that the application of U.S. law to the 
defendants was justified by international law—specifically, the territorial and protective 
principles of extraterritorial prescriptive jurisdiction.125 Therefore, in the First Circuit’s 
view, there had been no violation of the defendants’ due process rights.126 Although the 
First Circuit did not say so expressly, the implication seemed to be that, because 
customary international bases of prescriptive jurisdiction give foreign nationals fair 
warning that the United States can regulate their extraterritorial conduct, there is nothing 
arbitrary or fundamentally unfair about prosecuting them under U.S. law. This position 
has been controversial, but the First Circuit continues to use it in lieu of a nexus 
requirement.127 
 
  3. Fifth Circuit 
 
 The Fifth Circuit’s approach to the extraterritorial due process rights of alien 
defendants is particularly opaque, but nonetheless seems to turn on whether the defendant 
had some form of notice that the United States could prosecute him for his extraterritorial 
conduct. In United States v. Suerte, a Philippine national was prosecuted under the 
MDLEA for conspiracy to distribute cocaine after his Maltese-flagged vessel was 
stopped by the U.S. Coast Guard in international waters.128 The case was one of first 
impression for the Fifth Circuit, but the Court adopted the arbitrary or fundamentally 
unfair standard of Davis without conducting its own analysis because the government and 
defendant both agreed that it was the appropriate standard.129 However, the Fifth Circuit 
declined to adopt Davis’ nexus test because, after consulting the history of the Piracies 
                                                
123 Id. at 553 (“We decide today that due process does not require the government to prove a nexus between 
a defendant’s criminal conduct and the United States in a prosecution under the MDLEA when the flag 
nation has consented to the application of United States law to the defendants.”). 
124 Id. (citing Davis, 905 F.2d at 249 n.2). 
125 Id. The First Circuit’s reasoning and application of international law in Cardales has been criticized. See 
United States v. Angulo-Hernandez, 576 F.3d 59, 59 (1st Cir. 2009) (Torruella, J., dissenting from denial of 
rehearing en banc) (“These conclusions are both suspect. The consent of the flag nation is not material to a 
due process analysis focused on our government’s power over a foreign individual defendant. And the 
protective principle is simply inapplicable on these facts.”); Stigall, supra note 94, at 360 (“Both of these 
positions are questionable under established principles of international law.”).  
126 Cardales, 168 F.3d at 553.  
127 See, e.g., Angulo-Hernandez, 576 F.3d at 62 (Torruella, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) 
(arguing that “compliance with international law is necessary but not sufficient” for due process and that, 
instead, the First Circuit should adopt the Ninth Circuit’s nexus standard, which is more analogous to the 
minimum contacts test of Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington).  
128 United States v. Suerte, 291 F.3d 366, 367 (5th Cir. 2002). Although Suerte was not the first case in the 
Fifth Circuit to raise questions regarding the extraterritorial due process rights of alien defendants, see 
United States v. Alvarez-Mena, 765 F.2d 1259 (5th Cir. 1985) (upholding the application of the MDLEA’s 
predecessor, 21 U.S.C.A. § 955, to alien defendants caught transporting narcotics in international waters by 
the U.S. Coast Guard),  Suerte was the first case where the Fifth Circuit actually engaged in a due process 
inquiry, rather than a mere analysis of Congress’s power to proscribe extraterritorial conduct.  
129 Suerte, 291 F.3d at 377. 
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and Felonies Clause, the Court concluded that the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause does not impose any nexus requirement on statutes proscribing felonies on the 
high seas, like the MDLEA.130  
 
 The Fifth Circuit went on to explain that, assuming arguendo that the due process 
inquiry required the Court to consult international law, the United States did not need any 
nexus to prosecute the defendant consistent with the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause.131 First, the Court found that Malta, by consenting to the Coast Guard’s boarding 
of the vessel and the United States’ prosecution of the defendant under the MDLEA, had 
waived any international legal objection to the extraterritorial application of U.S. law. 
Second, by looking to Congress’s findings in the MDLEA and to the purposes of the 
United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances, the Court, in an apparent allusion to the universal and protective principles of 
prescriptive jurisdiction, found that drug trafficking is universally condemned and 
constitutes a serious threat to U.S. security.132 Thus, the Fifth Circuit held that the 
application of the MDLEA to the alien defendant was neither arbitrary nor fundamentally 
unfair because “[t]hose subject to its reach are on notice.”133  
 
  4. Eleventh Circuit 
 
 The Eleventh Circuit’s approach to the due process limitations on federal choice 
of law in extraterritorial prosecutions of foreign nationals also turns on whether 
international legal principles provide the United States with a basis to apply its laws 
extraterritorially, but the Eleventh Circuit has offered little explanation of the reasoning 
behind its approach.134 The Eleventh Circuit first confronted this issue in United States v. 
Ibarguen-Mosquera, where foreign nationals who were arrested by the U.S. Coast Guard 
for transporting cocaine in a flagless semi-submersible vessel off the coast of Colombia 
challenged their prosecution under the Drug Trafficking Vessel Interdiction Act (DTVIA) 
on due process grounds.135 The Eleventh Circuit, without more explanation than citing to 
the First Circuit’s decision in Cardales, declared that to comply with due process the 
extraterritorial application of U.S. law to a foreign national must be neither arbitrary nor 
fundamentally unfair. 136  Like the First Circuit, the Eleventh Circuit rejected the 
defendants’ claim that due process requires a nexus between their conduct and the United 
States because, as the Eleventh Circuit reasoned, international law permits any nation to 
subject stateless vessels to its jurisdiction since they are “international pariahs” with no 
internationally-recognized right to navigate freely on the high seas.137 For this reason, the 
                                                
130 Id. at 375 (“ . . . we hold that, for the MDLEA issue at hand, and to the extent the Due Process Clause 
may constrain the MDLEA’s extraterritorial reach, that clause does not impose a nexus requirement, in that 
Congress has acted pursuant to the Piracies and Felonies Clause.”); see Colangelo, supra note 23, at 174 
(discussing Suerte’s treatment of the history of the Piracy and Felonies Clause). 
131 Suerte, 291 F.3d at 375. 
132 Id. at 377. 
133 Id.  
134 Stigall, supra note 94, at 362. 
135 United States v. Ibarguen-Mosquera, 634 F.3d 1370 (11th Cir. 2011). 
136 Id. at 1378. 
137 Id. at 1379. 
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Court held that there was nothing arbitrary or fundamentally unfair about prosecuting the 
defendants under U.S. law.138 Although the Eleventh Circuit did not explain why 
compliance with international law is sufficient to ensure that the extraterritorial 
application of U.S. law does not violate due process, the Court’s implicit assumption 
seemed to be that international law gives all individuals fair warning that the United 
States could prosecute them for their conduct overseas. 
 
 C. The Driving Factors Behind the Circuit Split 
 
The seven circuits that have addressed this question unanimously agree that, in 
order to be consistent with Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, the extraterritorial 
application of U.S. law to a foreign national cannot be arbitrary or fundamentally unfair. 
The difference, then, is how courts should evaluate arbitrariness and fairness. Amidst the 
hazy reasoning of some of the circuits, one can discern the following trends: The 
approach of the three nexus test circuits—the Second, Fourth, and Ninth—seems truer to 
the Supreme Court’s Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague state choice of law standard because they 
ensure fundamental fairness by looking to the United States’ connections to the 
defendant’s conduct and U.S. interests arising from those contacts. By contrast, the notice 
test circuits—the First, Third, Fifth, and Eleventh—tend to treat fundamental fairness to 
the defendant as an inquiry independent of the United States’ contacts with, and interests 
arising from, the defendant’s conduct. They therefore look to whether international law 
provided the defendant with fair warning that the United States could regulate his 
extraterritorial conduct.139 This approach appears to be driven by courts’ concern for the 
principle of legality—the idea that laws must be ascertainable and non-retroactive in 
order to give individuals fair warning of what conduct is prohibited.140 The notice test, 
therefore, seems closer to Home Ins. Co. v. Dick and the model envisioned by Professors 
Brilmayer and Norchi than the state-centric choice of law approach of Allstate.141  
 
 Of course, the general confusion over due process limitations on the 
extraterritorial application of U.S. law means that the lines between these tests are not 
always entirely clear. The Ninth Circuit, for instance, has compared the nexus inquiry to 
the minimum contacts test in personal jurisdiction analysis because both, according to the 
Ninth Circuit, are concerned with ensuring that only alien defendants who should 
reasonably anticipate being haled into U.S. court are subjected to U.S. law.142 Moreover, 
                                                
138 Id. (“Because extraterritorial jurisdiction is proper, we conclude that the enactment of the DTVIA does 
not offend the Due Process Clause of the Constitution.”). Presumably, the Court meant to refer to the 
DTVIA’s application to the defendants, rather than the statute’s enactment, since due process requires an 
inquiry into the specific application of what might otherwise be a constitutional statute. The imprecision of 
the Eleventh Circuit’s phrasing here once again highlights the significant confusion in the circuits over how 
due process applies in extraterritorial prosecutions of foreign nationals.  
139 Colangelo, supra note 23, at 165. 
140 Id. at 166.  
141 Note that Professors Brilmayer and Norchi argued that notice, in and of itself, was insufficient for due 
process purposes, although they were most likely referring to notice from the United States, rather than 
notice from principles of international law. See Brilmayer and Norchi, supra note 53, at 1243. 
142 See Klimavicius-Viloria, 144 F.3d at 1249 (explaining that the nexus inquiry, like the minimum contacts 
test in personal jurisdiction, ensures that a U.S. court will only assert jurisdiction over a foreign national 
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the Ninth Circuit’s carve out for crimes subject to universal jurisdiction suggests that the 
concept of notice might be an implicit factor driving the nexus test.143 At least one 
commentator has gone so far as to argue that the nexus test is actually a variation of the 
notice test because, in looking to whether a foreign national voluntarily affiliated himself 
with the United States by committing an extraterritorial act that did, does, or will have 
some impact on the United States, the nexus test ensures that the alien defendant had fair 
warning that the United States could prosecute him for his conduct.144 Nonetheless, as 
Part IV demonstrates, a comparison of the outcome of the defendants’ due process claims 
in United States v. Ahmed under the nexus and notice tests suggests that these standards 
are distinct and that they can produce different results for the same due process claim in 
different jurisdictions.    
 
IV.  Evaluating these Competing Standards through the Prism of United States v. Ahmed  
 
 If the alien defendants in United States v. Ahmed invoke the Fifth Amendment’s 
Due Process Clause, it will be the first case in which a court is forced to decide if the 
United States can extraterritorially prosecute foreign nationals for providing material 
support to terrorism where that support is not directed at the United States or U.S. 
nationals.145 In light of the circuit split over the appropriate choice of law test, the 
outcome of the defendants’ due process claims will probably depend on whether the 
District Court of the Eastern District of New York applies the nexus or notice test. If the 
District Court follows Second Circuit precedent and applies the nexus test, as is likely, it 
will probably find a sufficient connection between U.S. national security interests and the 
defendants’ extraterritorial conduct. However, if the District Court forgoes precedent and 
applies the notice test, the Court might find that the defendants had no fair warning that 
the United States could regulate their extraterritorial conduct because international law 
does not recognize a basis for the United States to regulate material support to terrorism 
that is not directed at the United States or U.S. nationals. This divergence in outcomes 
raises serious questions about how courts should protect the due process rights of foreign 
nationals in extraterritorial 18 U.S.C. § 2339B prosecutions.146 
                                                                                                                                            
who should reasonably anticipate being haled into court in the United States); Zakharov, 468 F.3d at 1177 
(comparing the nexus requirement to minimum contacts in personal jurisdiction analysis). 
143 See, e.g., Shi, 525 F.3d at 723 (“Due process does not require a nexus between such an offender and the 
United States because the universal condemnation of the offender's conduct puts him on notice that his acts 
will be prosecuted by any state where he is found.”). 
144 See Colangelo, supra note 23, at 166 (arguing that the nexus requirement merely functions to ensure that 
the criteria of the notice inquiry are met); Al Kassar, 660 F.3d at 119 (“The idea of fair warning is that ‘no 
man shall be held criminally responsible for conduct which he could not reasonably understand to be 
proscribed.’”) (quoting Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 351 (1964)).  
145 See generally Kontorovich, The Offenses Clause, supra note 2. 
146 An interesting question, but one that is probably beyond the scope of this paper, is whether the State of 
New York could prosecute the defendants consistent with due process, assuming their extraterritorial 
conduct was covered by New York’s Anti-Terrorism Act. In contrast to the outcome under the nexus test in 
the federal context, the defendants in a hypothetical The People of the State of New York v. Ahmed would 
have a much better chance of prevailing on the due process question because New York State lacks the 
United States’ contacts with, and interests arising from, the defendants’ extraterritorial conduct. In contrast 
to the federal government, the State of New York has no national defense, foreign relations, or economic 
interest in the stability of the Government of Somalia or the Horn of Africa. Moreover, the State of New 
York could not analogize to the reasoning of Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project because there is no 
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 A. United States v. Ahmed under the Nexus Test 
 
 Despite the fact that the defendants in United States v. Ahmed neither directed, 
nor intended to direct, their material support towards the United States, the District Court 
will probably find that their support to al-Shabaab threatened, and thus created a nexus to, 
U.S. national security interests such that the extraterritorial application of 18 U.S.C. § 
2339B to their case is consistent with the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. The 
Second Circuit has held that, for due process purposes, a nexus may exist when the aim 
of a foreign national’s conduct abroad is to cause harm inside the United States or harm 
to U.S. citizens or interests.147 Another nexus test jurisdiction, the Fourth Circuit, has 
held that even if an alien does not target his extraterritorial conduct towards the United 
States, that conduct may still affect significant U.S. interests such that a sufficient nexus 
exists for due process purposes.148 This reasoning could help the District Court find a 
nexus in United States v. Ahmed because, in designating al-Shabaab as a foreign terrorist 
organization, the Secretary of State has certified that the group “threatens the security of 
U.S. nationals or the national security (national defense, foreign relations, or the 
economic interests) of the United States.”149 For instance, al-Shabaab’s attacks against 
the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia150 and the African Union Mission in 
Somalia threaten the United States’ foreign relations interest in the stability of 
Somalia.151 Moreover, as its repeated terror attacks in Kenya and Uganda demonstrate, 
                                                                                                                                            
evidence that providing material support to al-Shabaab in its fight against the Government of Somalia frees 
up resources that will be used against New York specifically (despite the fact that there is evidence that this 
material support frees up resources to be used against the United States more broadly). Even if a court were 
to apply the notice test in a hypothetical The People of the State of New York v. Ahmed, so long as the 
defendants never directed nor intended to direct their conduct towards New York, they would always 
prevail on the due process question because they lacked notice. After all, because New York State is not a 
sovereign state in the international system, it has no jurisdiction to proscribe extraterritorial conduct under 
international law and, therefore, foreign nationals with no connection to New York could never be put on 
notice that New York State could prosecute them for their overseas conduct. Of course, all of this assumes 
that a court would apply the Allstate standard. In fact, since the Full Faith and Credit Clause would not be 
at play, it would be more appropriate for the court to look to Home Ins. Co. v. Dick in analyzing due 
process, which—given Dick’s concern about the reasonable expectations of defendants—would make the 
defendants in a hypothetical The People of the State of New York v. Ahmed even more likely to prevail. 
147 Al Kassar, 660 F.3d at 118. 
148 Brehm, 691 F.3d at 552 (holding that, even though the alien defendant did not target his violent conduct 
towards the United States, a sufficient nexus existed for due process purposes because the alien’s actions, 
which took place on a U.S. military base while he was working under a contract with the U.S. military, 
affected significant U.S. interests on the base). 
149 U.S. Dep’t of State, “Foreign Terrorist Organizations,” supra note 10 (describing the legal criteria for 
the designation of a foreign terrorist organization under § 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act); 
U.S. Dep’t of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, “Designation of al-Shabaab as a 
Foreign Terrorist Organization,” Feb. 26, 2008, http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/102446.htm.  
150 At the time that the defendants in United States v. Ahmed were apprehended, the Transitional Federal 
Government (TFG) was the interim authority in Somalia. However, the Federal Government of Somalia 
officially succeeded the TFG in August 2012. See CIA World Factbook, “Somalia: Introduction,” June 23, 
2014, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/so.html. 
151 See, e.g., Testimony of Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Linda Thomas-Greenfield, 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee on African Affairs, Oct. 3, 2013, 
http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Thomas-Greefield_Testimony.pdf (“Our primary interest in 
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al-Shabaab’s conduct threatens broader U.S. foreign relations interests in the regional 
stability of the Horn of Africa.152 Consequently, the District Court will probably find that 
by providing material support to al-Shabaab—even support that was only intended to 
help al-Shabaab fight foreign governments on foreign soil—the extraterritorial conduct of 
the defendants affected significant U.S. interests, which created a nexus to the United 
States.  
 
 The District Court might also look to the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Holder v. 
Humanitarian Law Project to conclude that the defendants’ material support to al-
Shabaab threatened U.S. national security by freeing up other al-Shabaab resources that 
could be directed against the United States. In Humanitarian Law Project, the Court held 
that 18 U.S.C. § 2339B’s prohibition against providing non-violent material support to 
designated foreign terrorist organizations did not violate the First Amendment’s Free 
Speech Clause.153 The Court’s reasoning relied, in part, on the Executive Branch’s 
determination that any support to a designated foreign terrorist organization threatens the 
United States because terrorist groups are structurally and organizationally fluid.154 As 
the Court noted, “The [Executive’s submissions] shows that designated foreign terrorist 
organizations do not maintain organizational firewalls between social, political, and 
terrorist operations, or financial firewalls between funds raised for humanitarian activities 
                                                                                                                                            
Somalia is to help the people of Somalia build a peaceful nation with a stable government, able to ensure 
civil security and services for its citizens. This in turn will prevent terrorists from using Somali territory as 
a safe haven.”); U.S. Africa Command, Somalia (accessed July 6, 2014) 
http://www.africom.mil/africa/east-africa/somalia (“U.S. foreign policy objectives in Somalia are to 
promote political and economic stability, prevent the use of Somalia as a haven for international terrorism, 
and alleviate the humanitarian crisis caused by years of conflict, drought, flooding, and poor governance.”); 
Testimony of Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Donald Yamamoto, Senate 
Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on African Affairs, Aug. 3, 2011, 
http://www.state.gov/p/af/rls/rm/2011/169505.htm (“Al-Shabaab is a U.S.-designated foreign terrorist 
organization and has also been sanctioned by the United Nations for its role in threatening the peace, 
security, and stability of Somalia including disrupting the Djibouti Peace Process . . .”); U.S. Dep’t of State 
Fact Sheet, U.S. Assistance in Somalia (May 7, 2013), 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/05/209062.htm (explaining that U.S. assistance to Somalia “aims to 
help develop a stable government; ensure Somalia is not a safe-haven for terrorists; respond to and mitigate 
humanitarian crises; combat piracy; and prevent instability in Somalia from destabilizing the region.”). 
152  See U.S. National Counterterrorism Center, “Al-Shabaab,” (accessed July 6, 2014), 
http://www.nctc.gov/site/groups/al_shabaab.html (discussing al-Shabaab terror attacks in Kenya and 
Uganda); see also  Jeffrey Gettleman and Nicholas Kulish, Gunmen Kill Dozens in Terror Attack on Kenya 
Mall, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/22/world/africa/nairobi-mall-
shooting.html; Al-Shabab claims new deadly attack in Kenya, AL JAZEERA, June 17, 2014, 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2014/06/al-shabab-claims-new-deadly-attack-kenya-
201461782915271188.html; Yamamoto Testimony, supra note 151, (“In the long term, regional security in 
the Horn of Africa requires political stability in Somalia.”). 
153 Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010). 
154 Id. at 33 (“The State Department informs us that ‘[t]he experience and analysis of the U.S. government 
agencies charged with combating terrorism strongly suppor[t]’ Congress’s finding that all contributions to 
foreign terrorist organizations further their terrorism . . . . In the Executive’s view: ‘Given the purposes, 
organizational structure, and clandestine nature of foreign terrorist organizations, it is highly likely that any 
material support to these organizations will ultimately inure to the benefit of their criminal, terrorist 
functions—regardless of whether such support was ostensibly intended to support non-violent, non-terrorist 
activities.’”) (citations omitted).  
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and those used to carry out terrorist attacks.”155 Thus, the Court concluded that even non-
violent material support to terrorist organizations frees up other resources that could be 
put to violent ends.156 Similarly, federal prosecutors could argue that the material support 
that the defendants in United States v. Ahmed provided to al-Shabaab—despite the fact 
that it was not directed against the United States or U.S. nationals—increased al-
Shabaab’s ability to target the United States and U.S. citizens by freeing up resources that 
otherwise would have been expended on al-Shabaab’s fight against the Somali, Kenyan, 
and Ugandan governments. Even if the District Court were not entirely persuaded by this 
logic, it seems likely that the Court would defer to the Executive’s primacy in national 
security affairs given the judiciary’s long-standing practice of doing so and the general 
confusion surrounding the applicability of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause to 
foreign nationals.157  
 
 B. United States v. Ahmed under the Notice Test 
 
 By contrast, if the District Court were to stray from Second Circuit precedent and 
instead evaluate the defendants’ Fifth Amendment due process claims in United States v. 
Ahmed under the notice test, the defendants would have a much greater chance of 
prevailing. As Part III discussed, notice test jurisdictions like the First, Third, Fifth, and 
Eleventh circuits inquire into whether a foreign national should reasonably anticipate 
being prosecuted by the United States for his extraterritorial conduct, and these 
jurisdictions most often do so by looking to customary international principles of 
prescriptive jurisdiction. Here, the defendants could argue that—even though  the scienter 
requirement of 18 U.S.C. § 2339B requires that they have knowledge that al-Shabaab is a 
designated terrorist organization or that it engages in terrorist activity or terrorism158—
they could not have reasonably anticipated being subjected to U.S. law because 
customary international legal principles do not provide the United States with jurisdiction 
over their overseas material support to al-Shabaab. Without any intent to direct their 
conduct towards the United States or U.S. nationals, neither the territorial, the protective, 
nor the passive personality principles of prescriptive jurisdiction could have put the 
defendants on notice that the United States could regulate their extraterritorial material 
support to al-Shabaab. Although prosecutors could argue that certain acts of terrorism are 
jus cogens crimes subject to universal jurisdiction,159 that position is disputed,160 and,  
                                                
155 Id. at 5. 
156 Id. at 30. 
157 See, e.g., Id. at 33–34 (“Th[e] evaluation of the facts by the Executive, like Congress’s assessment, is 
entitled to deference. This litigation implicates sensitive and weighty interests of national security and 
foreign affairs . . . . ‘neither the Members of this Court nor most federal judges begin the day with briefings 
that may describe new and serious threats to our Nation and its people.’ It is vital in this context ‘not to 
substitute . . . our own evaluation of evidence for a reasonable evaluation by the Legislative Branch.’”) 
(citations omitted). 
158 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1). 
159 See, e.g., Colangelo, supra note 23, at 176–77 (arguing that the United States can exercise universal 
jurisdiction to extraterritorially “proscribe [the] bombing [of] public places, infrastructure, transportation 
systems, airports and aircraft, as well as hijacking aircraft, hostage taking, and even financing terrorist 
organizations.”).  
160 See, e.g., Yousef, 327 F.3d at 106–08 (finding that there is no international consensus defining or 
proscribing terrorism).  
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regardless, there is no evidence that any such international prohibition extends to material 
support to terrorism, which the United States has criminalized to a degree unmatched by 
any other country.161 Thus, if the District Court were to adopt the notice test of the First, 
Third, Fifth, or Eleventh Circuit, it might find that the extraterritorial application of 18 
U.S.C. § 2339B to the defendants in United States v. Ahmed is arbitrary or fundamentally 
unfair and, therefore, violates the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. 
 
 C. What United States v. Ahmed Reveals about these Competing Standards 
 
 As this analysis shows, an alien defendant in an extraterritorial 18 U.S.C. § 2339B 
prosecution in a nexus test jurisdiction will always be deemed to have a sufficient 
connection to the United States because the defendant provided material support to an 
organization that, by definition, threatens the security of U.S. nationals or the national 
defense, foreign relations, or economic interests of the United States.162 This outcome 
raises serious questions about the ability of the nexus test to prevent arbitrary or 
fundamentally unfair applications of U.S. law overseas. While a foreign national who 
directs, or intends to direct, his extraterritorial conduct towards the United States should 
reasonably foresee the possibility of being prosecuted in U.S. court, it is difficult to 
imagine how every foreign supporter of an armed group in a foreign civil war could 
reasonably be aware that the group threatens the national defense, foreign relations, or 
economic interests of the United States because the United States has complex and cross-
cutting strategic interests in every corner of the globe.  
 
For instance, the young Sunni man in Aleppo who intends no harm to the United 
States, but in an effort to stop the Assad regime’s indiscriminate attacks on his city, 
contributes a portion of his monthly income to the rebel group that controls his 
neighborhood, al-Nusra Front, has opened himself to liability under 18 U.S.C. § 2339B in 
nexus test jurisdictions. After all, the Secretary of State has designated al-Nusra Front as 
a terrorist organization and, therefore, any support he offers to the group frees up 
resources for it to use against the national defense, foreign relations, or economic 
interests of the United States.163 By contrast, the young Sunni man on the other side of 
town, who also intends no harm to the United States but wants to stop Assad’s attacks, 
does not risk U.S. prosecution for providing financial support to his neighborhood’s rebel 
group, a faction loyal to the Free Syrian Army, because they are not a designated terrorist 
organization. In fact, the United States considers the success of the Free Syrian Army as 
                                                
161 See Colangelo, supra note 23, at 177 (“ . . . however, a theory of universal jurisdiction does not avoid 
constitutional restraints on federal extraterritoriality where the crime is not universal under international 
law. Thus, offenses that are not the subjects of widely held international prohibitions, like providing 
material assistance to, or receiving military training from a foreign terrorist organization, do not qualify as 
universal.”); Urbelis, supra note 25, at 324 (arguing that “[b]ecause the offenses contained within [18 
U.S.C.] sections 2339A, 2339B,  and 2339C are an order removed from terrorist acts themselves, and 
because there does not exist anything even resembling a universal consensus about the definition of 
material support, in all likelihood the universality principle alone will not support extraterritorial 
jurisdiction over such offenses.”). 
162 U.S. Dep’t of State, “Foreign Terrorist Organizations,” supra note 10; U.S. Dep’t of State, “Designation 
of al-Shabaab as a Foreign Terrorist Organization,” supra note 149. 
163 See U.S. Dep’t of State, “Foreign Terrorist Organizations,” supra note 10 (listing al-Nusra Front as a 
designated foreign terrorist organization). 
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being in its strategic interest.164 However, to the two young men in Aleppo—poor, 
illiterate, and unschooled in the complicated realpolitik of U.S. strategy in the region—
their actions and motivations are identical and, thus, the first man could not reasonably 
anticipate being prosecuted in the United States. 
 
Similarly, the elderly Kurdish woman living outside Mosul, who voluntarily and 
regularly shelters fighters from the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) traveling to the front 
to fight the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), is subject to prosecution under 18 
U.S.C. § 2339B in a nexus test jurisdiction because the PKK is a designated terrorist 
organization.165 Even though the woman never intended any harm to the United States, 
and knows that the fighters she is sheltering are attacking ISIS sites that the U.S. military 
is targeting from the air, her support to the PKK frees up resources that can be redirected 
against the national defense, foreign relations, or economic interests of the United States. 
By contrast, her friend on the other side of the village, another older Kurdish woman who 
does her part opposing ISIS by sheltering Kurdish volunteers fighting with the Pesh 
Merga, could not be prosecuted in the United States because those fighters do not belong 
to a designated terrorist organization. To these two uneducated women—who have never 
left their village let alone Nineveh Province—their contribution to the fight against ISIS 
is identical and, thus, the first woman could not reasonably anticipate being prosecuted in 
the United States. 
 
While the entanglement of U.S. allies and adversaries in Syria and Iraq is 
particularly complex, these same types of scenarios can play out in civil wars from 
Somalia to Nigeria where designated terrorist organizations are fighting foreign 
governments and other foreign non-state actors. These examples show that, from the 
foreign national defendant’s perspective, whether the United States happens to have a 
national defense, foreign relations, or economic interest in supporting the host 
government, the opposition, or—as in Syria—something in between, is more like a game 
of chance than a fact which he or she could reasonably ascertain. Such a watered down 
due process inquiry might assuage critics of extraterritorial due process, like Professor 
Weisburd, but if foreign nationals prosecuted for overseas conduct do have due process 
rights, as every circuit to address the question has agreed, it seems contradictory to 
protect these rights with a seemingly empty standard.  
 
 The hollowness of the nexus test is, in many ways, a product of the Supreme 
Court’s Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague standard, on which the three nexus test circuits have 
overly relied. As discussed in Part II, Allstate, in attempting to establish a state choice of 
law test consistent with the Due Process Clause and the Full Faith and Credit Clause, 
created a highly permissive standard that assesses whether an application of state law is 
arbitrary or fundamentally unfair by looking to the state’s contacts with the controversy 
                                                
164 See, e.g., Ben Hubbard, Eric Schmitt, and Mark Mazzetti, U.S. Pins Hope on Syrian Rebels With 
Loyalties All Over the Map, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2014, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/12/world/middleeast/us-pins-hope-on-syrian-rebels-with-loyalties-all-
over-the-map.html (discussing the Obama Administration’s determination to arm the Free Syrian Army in 
order to fight the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria and the Assad regime). 
165 See U.S. Dep’t of State, “Foreign Terrorist Organizations,” supra note 10 (listing the Kurdistan 
Workers’ Party as a designated foreign terrorist organization). 
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and the state’s interests arising from those contacts.166 By contrast, the Supreme Court in 
Home Ins. Co. v. Dick suggested, at least indirectly, that courts should be more concerned 
about the expectations of the defendant than the interests of the regulating state when 
assessing whether an extraterritorial application of state law is consistent with the Due 
Process Clause.167  Professors Brilmayer and Norchi similarly described “individual 
fairness” as its own inquiry independent of state contacts and state interests in their 
influential article, although they did so by drawing on Allstate rather than Dick.168  
 
Unfortunately, even though the Full Faith and Credit Clause is not in play in the 
federal choice of law context, the Second, Fourth, and Ninth circuits have, like Allstate, 
evaluated fundamental fairness by assessing the state’s contacts with, and interests arising 
from, the defendant’s extraterritorial conduct, rather than by treating individual fairness 
as a separate inquiry. While this approach has been criticized for stressing state 
sovereignty interests at the expense of individual liberty in the state choice of law 
context, this paper’s analysis of United States v. Ahmed demonstrates that Allstate’s 
emphasis on state interests is magnified in extraterritorial material support to terrorism 
prosecutions.169 Where the security of the state is at issue, the state’s interests arising 
from its contacts with the defendant’s overseas conduct—however indirect or tangential 
that contact might be—take on paramount importance, which any individual defendant’s 
liberty interests would be hard-pressed to overcome, especially when taking into 
consideration the judiciary’s long-standing practice of deferring to the Executive Branch 
in national security affairs.170 
 
 By contrast, the notice test is more protective of the alien defendant’s liberty 
interests and better ensures that extraterritorial applications of U.S. law are neither 
arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair. By looking to whether the foreign national received 
fair warning that the United States could prosecute him for his overseas conduct, the 
notice test emphasizes fairness to the individual who is subjected to the extraterritorial 
application of U.S. law, which is consistent with traditional conceptions of due process as 
an individual right and seems more or less in keeping with the Court’s approach in 
Dick. 171  Admittedly, fair warning can be an elusive concept in extraterritorial 
prosecutions because, in contrast to an American citizen, a foreign national should not be 
reasonably expected to know and understand the strictures of U.S. law, at least no more 
so than an American citizen should be expected to know the law of other countries. 
However, customary international principles of extraterritorial prescriptive jurisdiction 
can serve as a proxy for notice because all persons—whatever citizenship they may hold 
                                                
166 Allstate, 449 U.S. at 313. 
167 Dick, 281 U.S. at 410. 
168 Brilmayer and Norchi, supra note 53, at 1243. 
169 See, e.g., Fruehwald, supra note 76, at 56–57. 
170 See, e.g., Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 797 (explaining the Court’s duty to defer to the Executive in national 
security affairs); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 678 (2006) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting the 
Court’s “well-established duty to respect the Executive’s judgment in matters of military operations and 
foreign affairs.”). 
171 Fruehwald, supra note 76, at 57. 
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and whatever country they may reside in—are subject to, and responsible for knowing 
their obligations under, international law.172  
 
 For instance, if the defendants in United States v. Ahmed had helped al-Shabaab 
attack a location in the United States, harm a U.S. national overseas, or bomb a civilian 
airliner abroad, the United States could prosecute them consistent with due process 
because the territorial and protective principles, the passive personality principle, and the 
universality principle, respectively, put the defendants on notice that the United States 
can exercise jurisdiction over their extraterritorial conduct. There would be nothing 
arbitrary or fundamentally unfair about applying U.S. law to the alien defendants in this 
manner because, like everyone else in the world, the defendants are responsible for 
knowing the consequences of their actions under international law. However, prosecuting 
the defendants for conduct that the United States does not have jurisdiction to regulate 
under international law—like providing material support to a designated foreign terrorist 
organization where there is no nexus to the United States—would be arbitrary or 
fundamentally unfair because the defendants would have had no fair warning that their 
conduct could subject them to U.S. prosecution. Thus, without notice, the extraterritorial 
prosecution of foreign nationals under 18 U.S.C. § 2339B is inconsistent with the Fifth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause. 
 
  Conclusion  
 
The question of how to assess the due process claims of foreign nationals in 
extraterritorial 18 U.S.C. § 2339B prosecutions is one of growing significance. Recent 
events in Syria and Iraq notwithstanding, the Obama Administration continues to move 
away from an armed conflict paradigm with al-Qa’ida and its affiliates in favor of 
prosecuting suspected foreign terrorists in federal court. As a result, cases like United 
States v. Ahmed will become more common in the coming years. The Constitution’s 
expansive grant of extraterritorial powers to Congress makes it highly unlikely that 
defendants in these prosecutions will succeed in facially challenging statutes like 18 
U.S.C. § 2339B. Instead, they are more likely to succeed in arguing that the application 
of 18 U.S.C. § 2339B to their overseas conduct violates the Fifth Amendment’s Due 
Process Clause. For this reason, it is critically important for courts to agree on an 
appropriate and uniform standard by which to judge these claims. 
 
Unfortunately, there is a great deal of confusion in the circuits regarding the due 
process rights of foreign nationals in extraterritorial prosecutions. All seven circuits that 
have addressed this question agree that the protections of the Fifth Amendment’s Due 
Process Clause extend to foreign nationals subjected to the extraterritorial application of 
U.S. law and, recalling the Supreme Court’s Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague standard, all seven 
have held that the application of U.S. law cannot be arbitrary or fundamentally unfair. 
However, the circuits disagree over how to evaluate arbitrariness and unfairness. The 
Second, Fourth, and Ninth circuits maintain that, except in cases of crimes subject to 
universal jurisdiction, there must be some nexus between the United States and the 
defendant’s conduct for the United States to prosecute the defendant consistent with due 
                                                
172 See generally Colangelo, supra note 23, at 174. 
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process. The First, Third, Fifth, and Eleventh circuits, by contrast, assess whether an 
extraterritorial application of U.S. law is arbitrary or fundamentally unfair by inquiring 
whether the foreign national had notice that his conduct was subject to U.S. regulation. In 
doing so, these circuits often look to whether customary international legal principles 
provide a basis for the United States to exercise prescriptive jurisdiction over the 
defendant.  
  
This circuit split has real and significant consequences for defendants in 
extraterritorial material support to terrorism prosecutions like United States v. Ahmed. 
Under the nexus test that the District Court for the Eastern District of New York is likely 
to apply, prosecutors can argue that the defendants’ conduct had a sufficient connection 
to the United States because their material support to al-Shabaab, a designated terrorist 
organization, threatens the United States’ national security interests in the stability of 
Somalia and the Horn of Africa and, by the logic of Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 
frees up resources that can be directed against the United States. In other words, nexus 
test jurisdictions—the Second, Fourth, and Ninth circuits—will always find a sufficient 
connection to the United States in extraterritorial 18 U.S.C. § 2339B prosecutions simply 
because of the group’s designation as a terrorist organization. By contrast, if the 
defendants in United States v. Ahmed were prosecuted in a notice test jurisdiction—the 
First, Third, Fifth, or Eleventh Circuit—they could more successfully argue that the 
application of U.S. law to their overseas conduct violates the Due Process Clause; 
because customary international law does not provide the United States with a basis to 
exercise jurisdiction over a foreign national’s material support to a foreign terrorist 
organization where that support is not directed against the United States or U.S. nationals, 
the defendants in United States v. Ahmed could claim that they had no fair warning that 
their activities abroad were subject to U.S. regulation. 
 
 The emptiness of the nexus test is a result of the Second, Fourth, and Ninth 
circuits too heavily drawing on Allstate’s state choice of law decision, which 
intermingled its Due Process Clause analysis with its Full Faith and Credit Clause 
analysis and created a standard that seemingly emphasized state contacts and interests at 
the expense of individual fairness. The application of the nexus test to the due process 
claims of the defendants in United States v. Ahmed demonstrates that Allstate’s focus on 
state interests is magnified in the extraterritorial material support to terrorism context; in 
these prosecutions, the United States’ interests arising from its contacts with the 
defendant’s activities abroad—however indirect that contact might be—are of paramount 
significance and, given the judiciary’s practice of deferring to the Executive Branch in 
national security affairs, courts are likely to find that they trump an individual alien 
defendant’s liberty interests.  
 
The notice test is, by comparison, significantly more protective of foreign 
nationals’ due process rights because it assesses whether the alien defendant had fair 
warning that the United States could prosecute him for his overseas conduct. By using 
customary international principles of extraterritorial prescriptive jurisdiction as a proxy 
for notice, the First, Third, Fifth, and Eleventh circuits make sure that only foreign 
nationals who had fair warning of the unlawfulness of their conduct are subject to U.S. 
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prosecution. This approach is more consistent with traditional conceptions of due process 
as an individual right and with the Supreme Court’s concern about the reasonable 
expectations of defendants in Home Ins. Co. v. Dick.  
 
Ultimately, the Supreme Court will need to resolve this circuit split. While the 
nexus test may allow the United States greater flexibility in terrorism prosecutions, the 
Court must acknowledge that, by prevailing over the due process rights of every foreign 
national who provides material support to a designated terrorist organization in a conflict 
abroad, this hollow standard undermines the very rights that it seeks to protect. Instead, 
the Court should recognize that the notice test is the best way of ensuring that the United 
States’ prosecutions for extraterritorial material support to terrorism are consistent with 
the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Doing so will put some foreign supporters of 
terrorist organizations beyond the reach of federal prosecutors, but it will go a long way 
towards strengthening the U.S. justice system at a time when the government’s counter-
terrorism strategy is increasingly relying on the integrity of that system.  
 
 
